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E D I T O R S
 T he recent global economic and financial crisis revealed once againthe importance of social protection in shielding the poorest andmost vulnerable people from the worst impacts of a sudden shock
to the economy. Social protection programmes such as cash transfers and
expanded public works were also important instruments for raising domestic
demand in many of the stimulus packages that were introduced to counter
the downturn. As the world starts a fragile recovery, however, there may be
a temptation to roll back programmes as the intensity of the economic shock
dissipates. Countries could instead explore opportunities for prioritising and
institutionalising social protection programmes.
Much evidence suggests that, when properly designed and implemented, social
protection not only protects the vulnerable but is also an investment in future
growth and prosperity. In this light, the aftermath of the global crisis provides an
opportunity to improve and expand social protection programmes where they
already exist, and to create new ones where they are absent. Social protection
should not be seen as merely a safety net to be deployed when times are
difficult; neither is it a panacea for development, but it can be key to promoting
strong and inclusive growth.
A recent South-South dialogue organised by IPC-IG and held in Johannesburg
from 11 to 14 October 2010 showed that governments in the global South are
comfortable with broad definitions that emphasise the expansion of capabilities
and opportunities. For instance, in South Africa social protection “seeks to
provide the basic means for all people living in the country to effectively
participate and advance in social and economic life, and in turn to contribute to
social and economic development.” Presentations at the dialogue from Zambia,
Brazil, East Timor and other countries used similar language, placing formal and
informal mechanisms for social protection at the very core of their national
development strategies.
Traditionally, social protection programmes have been regarded as important
because of concerns for equity and because they are a means of directly
alleviating poverty. Emerging micro-level evidence, however, shows that such
programmes can have strong efficiency effects and thus can be growth-enhancing.
This can occur through increasing poor people’s access to assets—by enabling
them to buy livestock, building productive infrastructure such as roads and
irrigation, promoting education and health, or reducing risk so that people can
use assets more efficiently.
Moreover, there is substantial evidence that the inability of many families to
manage and cope with risks leads to sub-optimal investment and consumption
choices that may harm economic efficiency. Social protection can also contribute
to economic growth by reducing inequality and strengthening social justice and
cohesion. On the other hand, concerns about perverse incentives and leakages
can be addressed through well designed programmes. Expressions of concern
about the unaffordability of social protection programmes are often
exaggerated, especially in view of the programmes’ benefits.
According to the participants at the South-South dialogue, this also means that
the current practice of viewing social protection as the exclusive purview of
ministries of gender and social development needs to be rethought. While these
ministries have a clear role in the implementation of specific aspects of the social
protection agenda, there is a need to involve a range of other stakeholders more
directly. Clearly, community representatives have critical roles to play, namely
in ensuring accountability and in the effective delivery of transfers and services.
Elected representatives in legislatures are instrumental in providing the legal basis
for a country’s social protection system and for institutionalising citizens’ rights.
In the executive, ministries of finance and planning need to drive discussions not
only on the fiscal space for financing social protection programmes (an important
issue in its own right), but also on how to entrench social protection more
effectively in a country’s longer-term development strategy, as a means of
making the growth process stronger, more resilient and more inclusive.
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As social protection programmes
spread in developing countries,
a number of researchers and policy
makers acknowledge sharing some
confusion about the boundaries of
social protection policy. Is microfinance
a social protection instrument?
What about programmes providing
agricultural input to small-scale farmers:
are they part of social protection?
Under what circumstances can policies
addressing discrimination and social
exclusion be considered as social
protection? These and similar questions
suggest uncertainty about the
boundaries of social protection policy.
At one level, this is a very practical
issue. Making Governance Work for the
Poor, the 2006 White Paper by Britain’s
Department for International Development
(DFID), made a commitment to “significantly
increase spending on social protection in
at least ten countries in Africa and Asia
by 2009”. Accountability to the British
parliament requires social protection
expenditures to be identified and
measured under specific budgetary items.
This applies to all countries with policy
commitments to social protection. In fact,
IMF guidelines on the identification of
social protection spending in national
income accounts are being gradually
implemented in developing countries.
At another level, uncertainty about
boundaries reflects the presence of
competing approaches to social protection.
The main aim of this article is to shed
light on these approaches, discover what
they tell us about where the boundaries
lie, and try to find some common ground.
The discussion below contrasts two
broad approaches to social protection.
One approach starts from established
social policy frameworks, tried and tested
in developed countries. Let us call this
the social policy/public finance approach.
In this approach, social protection has
three main components: social insurance,
social assistance, and employment-
related policies. Social insurance covers
contributory programmes providing
protection against life-course and
work-related hazards. Social assistance
covers tax-financed programmes
addressing poverty and deprivation.
And employment-related programmes
and policies cover “passive” policies
protecting the rights and entitlements
of workers, as well as “active”
programmes and policies promoting
employment and labour productivity.
The other approach starts from
development frameworks and concerns.
There are many variants of this approach
and wide areas of disagreement, but at
its core it proposes that development is
broader than rising incomes per capita
and includes attention to human
development, governance, the
environment and empowerment.
It advocates integrated development
strategies that advance on all these
fronts, a proposal captured in the notion
of sustainable development. For those
starting from a development approach,
social protection is, at its most basic,
a framework that packages direct
assistance to households in poverty
with interventions across the different
dimensions of development.
It is apparent from this brief
characterisation of these two
approaches that the development
approach will consistently push social
protection towards a broader and more
encompassing policy framework. This is
in contrast to the more focused scope
proposed by the social policy/public
finance approach. Many areas of
apparent confusion and controversy
over the role and scope of social
The Boundaries
of Social Protection
Uncertainty about
boundaries reflects the
presence of competing
approaches to
social protection.
One approach starts
from established social
policy frameworks, tried
and tested in developed
countries - the social policy/
public finance approach.
The other approach
starts from development
frameworks and concerns.
It proposes that
development is broader
than rising incomes
per capita and includes
attention to human
development, governance,
the environment
and empowerment.
by Armando Barrientos,
University of Manchester
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protection in developing countries,
and especially uncertainty about its
boundaries, can be traced to the spaces
between the social policy/public finance
approach and a development approach.
Finding common ground between
them will help give social protection
greater definition.
The social policy/public finance approach
has a lot to contribute. There is a great
deal for us to learn from the experiences
of developed countries as regards
poverty reduction and development.
The crucial role of registration in
enabling public assistance was well
understood in seventeenth-century
England. The advantages and
disadvantages of means testing and
other forms of targeting assistance to
poor households were comprehensively
discussed in the United States during its
“War on Poverty” in the late 1960s and
1970s. Most importantly, the integration
of social policies and programmes into
comprehensive welfare states in the
period following World War II, and their
evolution over time, offers invaluable
knowledge for developing countries.
At the same time, conditions in
developing countries recommend against
transferring European approaches and
institutions slavishly to developing
countries. Latin America’s experience
helps underline this point. The extension
of social insurance institutions that
began in the early twentieth century
never reached beyond workers in formal
employment, leading to “truncated” social
protection systems. The recent expansion
of social assistance programmes in the
region implicitly acknowledges the need
to find innovative ways to extend social
protection to those excluded from social
insurance. The development imperative
also requires that social policies maximise
their contribution to economic and
social development.
For developing countries, the challenge
is to strengthen the developmental role
of social policies, to integrate those
policies with social and economic
development, and to acknowledge
the primary role of social assistance,
especially in low-income countries.
Given the nature of this challenge,
a development approach has much
to contribute to adapting social
policies in developing countries.
Such an approach could help shed
light on how social policies should be
designed and implemented in developing
countries to help synergise social
and economic development.
Some factors, however, could limit this
collaboration. The multifaceted nature
of development, when applied to social
protection, can result in a crippling loss
of focus. Adding objectives and
instruments to social-protection
strategies could quickly encounter
diminishing returns. Well designed
social assistance programmes can be
effective in reducing poverty. In the
process they could have an impact on
disparities in access to basic services,
and can strengthen the productive
capacity of groups in poverty. But it is
much less likely that social assistance
programmes could deliver economy-wide
growth or empowerment.
The many and diverse development
gatekeepers (multilaterals, bilaterals,
international NGOs) have redefined
social protection many times in an
effort to make it fit with their versions
of development, but often these efforts
have not improved understanding of its
role and scope. This carries over to the
language of social protection. Social
assistance defines a fairly precise set
of instruments and objectives, but
terms such as “safety nets” or “smart”
interventions add, at best, some glamour
but little substance. There is a clear
and present danger in development
discourse that policies and strategies
perceived to be effective are turned into
silver bullets and applied indiscriminately.
The conclusion to draw from this
discussion is that the development
approach can be extremely useful
in ensuring that social protection is
developmental, but with the
understanding that development is
much bigger than social protection.
The recent extension of social protection
in developing countries has focused on
social assistance, and especially on the
reduction of extreme and persistent
poverty. Innovative programme
objectives and design are helping to
strengthen the developmental role of
social assistance (Barrientos et al., 2010).
In middle-income countries,
social assistance programmes
and policies are being successfully
integrated and institutionalised. These
are significant steps towards achieving
sustainable development.
To return to the questions posed at the
start of this article, microfinance can be
effective in supporting households with
assets. Distributing agricultural inputs
to poor farmers can help maintain food
supplies. In the right context, these are
effective development strategies with
the capacity to reduce poverty. There are
gains in linking these interventions with
social assistance, but there is little to be
gained from lumping them together.
Social assistance can make a
small contribution to reducing
discrimination, but stronger and more
effective interventions will be required.
Understanding the boundaries of social
protection will be essential to maintaining
a clear focus on the challenges ahead.
Barrientos, A., M. Niño-Zarazúa and
M. Maitrot (2010). Social Assistance in
Developing Countries Database version 5.
Report. Manchester, Brooks World Poverty
Institute: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1672090>.
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This article focuses on the system
of income security that Brazil built after
the enactment of the 1988 federal
constitution, which laid the foundations
of Brazilian democracy after 25 years
of military rule. The constitution made
social security a part of citizens’ rights
and gave it a broader scope. The system
was not built at once, but evolved from
an existing pension scheme implemented
by the state in the 1920s and 1930s.
Today, it consists of different monetary
benefits, granted on both contributory
and non-contributory bases, to citizens in
various circumstances of financial
insecurity. We argue here that despite its
limitations and challenges, this system
has proven quite effective in protecting
Brazilian citizens from many social risks, as
well as in reducing poverty and inequality.
Brazil’s first social protection policies
consisted of several pension and
medical-care systems serving specific
categories of salaried urban workers
(certain industrial workers, as well as
employees in the trade, banking
and transport sectors). Those systems
operated under a strict definition of
social security, which meant that the
benefits were provided solely on a
contributory basis2 and covered workers
only against traditional social risks—
that is, events that prevented them from
working (illness, old age and accidents).
The system was unified in the 1960s
and 1970s and came to be managed by a
single institution. Its coverage was then
extended to new occupational groups
(individual workers, as well as rural
and domestic workers).
Eligibility for benefits, however, remained
restricted to workers who made regular
contributions to the National Institute of
Social Security. Unemployment insurance
Income Security in Brazil:
Achievements and Challenges1
by Maria Paula Gomes dos Santos,
Institute of Applied Economic
Research (IPEA), Brazil
Brazil’s social protection
system has various income-
security devices helping
citizens face different risks
and contingencies, ranging
from contributory social
insurance to family
allowances.
 While non-contributory
benefits work for poverty
alleviation (an ex-post
support), contributory
benefits protect those in
the formal labour market,
preventing them from falling
into poverty when their
working capacity is impaired.
Each month Brazil’s income
security system provides
about 42 million benefits
(data for 2009) and covers
about 90 million people.
The State subsidises part
of the contributory social
insurance system for some
categories of workers with
low contributory capacity,
such as rural workers in
domestic production and
urban workers whose
contributions are insufficient
to guarantee lifelong benefits
of a minimum wage.
was implemented in the mid 1980s,
but only for formal workers who
paid contributions.
The 1988 constitution changed this
scenario by giving a more comprehensive
definition to social security. Under the
new definition, citizens were given the
right to protection by the state, even
when they were unable to pay direct
contributions. This decision led to the
expansion of social services, and to
the creation of new, non-contributory
cash benefits. Those, in addition to the
existing contributory benefits, gave
way to the development of an income
security system.
Under the new constitution, social
insurance (contributory) was also
expanded. Rural workers acquired the
same social-insurance rights and benefits
as urban workers.3 A non-contributory
cash benefit of one minimum wage was
introduced, envisaging financial support
for the poor elderly and the poor
disabled.4 The constitution also
determined that the lowest value
of the pension should not be less
than the national minimum wage.
These shifts allowed a significant
reduction of poverty among the elderly
in a short period. In 1981, the elderly
poor accounted for 18.4 per cent of the
population aged 65 and more; in 1995,
they accounted for 6.8 per cent, and
in 2009 for 1.4 per cent.
At the beginning of the 2000s, conditional
cash transfer programmes for low-income
families were introduced independently
by some states, municipalities and
the federal government itself.
These initiatives were unified in
2003, giving rise to the Bolsa Família
programme, which has expanded its
coverage since then to cover families
in need throughout the country.
1. This article is based on Ana Cleusa Serra Mesquita,
Luciana de Barros Jaccoud and Maria Paula Gomes dos
Santos (forthcoming). “Income Security in Brazilian Social
Policy: Between Social Risks and Poverty Alleviation”.
Brasilia, IPEA.
2. Contributions paid by workers and employers.
3. Before that, the value of their benefits was half
the value of the benefits paid to urban employees.
4. Those living in families with less than a quarter
of a minimum wage per capita.
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Brazilian Income Security Matrix
Social insurance (workers) Old age and disability grant Bolsa Família
ElderlyPrivate sector Public sector Disabled
Today, Brazil’s social protection system
has various income-security devices
helping citizens face different risks
and contingencies, ranging from
contributory social insurance to family
allowances. Each kind of benefit meets
different needs, given the extremely
diverse conditions of labour market
participation in the country.
These protections complement one
another. While non-contributory benefits
work for poverty alleviation (an ex-post
support), contributory benefits protect
those in the formal labour market,
preventing them from falling into
poverty when their working capacity
is impaired. Each month, Brazil’s income
security system provides about 42 million
benefits (data for 2009) and covers
about 90 million people. This has led to
significant positive outcomes in poverty
and inequality reduction in recent years:
between 2001 and 2009 the Gini index
fell from 0.594 to 0.539 (the reduction rate
being 9.1 per cent); and the percentage
of extreme poor (those with household
per capita income less than or equal
to 25 per cent of the minimum wage)
dropped from 22.9 per cent in
2003 to 10.9 per cent in 2009.
This system owes most of its positive
results to its underlying funding
arrangement. Apart from the fact that the
state bears the costs of non-contributory
benefits with tax revenue, it also subsidises
part of the contributory social insurance
system for some categories of workers
with low contributory capacity, such as
rural workers in domestic production
and urban workers whose contributions
are insufficient to guarantee lifelong
benefits of a minimum wage. Thus the
Brazilian social insurance system is based
on solidarity between generations
and risk categories.
Eligibility
Benefits
Active workers
Inactive workers
Coverage
Active
Inactive
December 2009
Spending
(per month)
December 2008
Employed
workers:
regular shared
contributions over
wages (worker) and
payroll (employer)
Individual
workers: regular
full contributions
Allowances in case
of illness, accident,
maternity and
confinement
Pensions for
workers and
survivors after
15 years of
contribution and
at the minimum
age of 65
(1 minimum wage
benefit);
Pensions for
workers and
survivors after 35
years (men) or 30
years (women) of
contribution
49 million
1.1 million
US$117.4 billion
7% of GDP
Public servants
(civilian and military)
covered by the
public servants’
statutory regime
Paid leave in case
of illness, accident,
and maternity
Pensions for
workers and
survivors after
35 years of
contribution and
at the age of 60
(man) and 30 years
of contribution
and at the age
of 55 (women)
6.23 million
3.18 million
US$71.6 billion
4% of GDP
Aged 65 or more
with household
per capita income
equal or less than a
quarter of
minimum wage
(US$73.3)
A monthly cash
benefit of 1
minimum wage
(US$293)
1.5 million
Household per
capita income
equal or less
than a quarter of
minimum wage
(US$73.3)
A monthly cash
benefit of 1
minimum wage
(US$293)
1.6 million
US$ 9.917 billion
0.54% of GDP
Household income
of US$40 or less
per capita
Maximum per
family
US$117.6
Minimum basic
benefit
US$40
(no children in
the household)
Variable benefit
children
US$13
Maximum 3
children up to
age 15
Variable benefit
adolescents
US$19.4
Maximum 2
adolescents aged
16–17
Household income
between US$41
and US$ 82
per capita
with children/
adolescents up
to the age of 17
Maximum per
family
US$77.6
Minimum basic
benefit
Only if there are
children in the
household
Variable benefit
children
US$13
Maximum 3
children up to
age 15
Variable benefit
adolescents
US$19.4
Maximum 2
adolescents aged
16–17
Employed and unemployed:
12,370,915 families
US$7.3 billion
0.4% of GDP
Sources: Ministries of Social Security, Social Development and Finance. Created by IPEA/ DISOC.
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This arrangement is not always
welcomed by researchers in the
development community (see Ribe
et al., 2010), who believe that “internal
subsidies” can do injustice to those
who contribute directly to the system,
discouraging their contribution. But it
seems reasonable and fair that these
state resources cover the social risks
of workers who cannot pay specific
contributions, but who do pay general
taxes and are co-responsible for national
output.5 This is because, in “solidarity”
systems, social insurance is based not
only on contributions but also on labour
activity, and because government
funding comes from direct and
indirect taxes that are paid by the whole
population, regardless of income level.6
This does not mean that such a system
provides sufficient income security, or
that there are not major challenges to
overcome. Brazil still has to advance its
social policies on income vulnerabilities.
Poverty among Brazilian children, for
example, is very high: 20.3 per cent of
them are affected by it.7 Besides that,
33 per cent of active (mostly urban)
workers are not protected against
traditional social risks. Filling these gaps
is essential for the population to enjoy a
level of welfare compatible with the
country’s wealth. But Brazil’s experience
may be useful for other countries, since
it has been built step-by-step without
neglecting historical institutions or
buying ready-made packages from
international advisors. 
5. The Brazilian social insurance system operates
as a pay-as-you-go system, providing a maximum
benefit that corresponds to about 6.5 times
the minimum wage.
6. In Brazil, taxes on sales and corporate profits,
as well as specific contributions for social policies,
are paid by the whole population since they are passed
on to final consumers.
7. Aged between 0 and 17.
Public policy in Botswana
aims to reduce poverty through
broad-based economic growth,
specifically through employment-
creation initiatives (Seleka et al., 2007).
But the government recognises that
“economic growth is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for poverty
reduction” (Coady, 2004: 1).
Hence the government has developed
a comprehensive system of social
safety nets (SSNs) to cater to the
special needs of vulnerable groups,
including the destitute, the elderly,
orphans, residents of remote areas,
malnourished children and people
with disabilities.
These safety nets have proven to be very
effective first lines of defence against
poverty for disadvantaged groups.
Moreover, the government has decided
to stretch the envelope further, within
the limits of fiscal prudence, to ensure
that human-security safeguards are
even more adequate.
The government provides a broad
spectrum of SSN programmes, designed
to meet special needs rather than general
income support. Existing SSNs address
the risks associated with malnutrition,
HIV/AIDS, unemployment, disability
and old age, and they appear to be
comprehensive over a life cycle.
Botswana has nine major SSN
programmes. In rough order
of coverage, these are:
 primary school feeding;
 vulnerable group feeding;
 old age pension scheme;
 destitute persons programme;
 orphan care;
 community home-based care;
 labour-based public works and
drought-relief programmes;
 remote-area development
programme; and
 World War II veterans programme.
In addition to these formal, government-
provided SSN programmes, Botswana
Social Safety Nets
in Botswana
by Chada Koketso,
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning,
Botswana
In Botswana,
the government has
developed a comprehensive
system of social safety
nets (SSNs).
They have proven to be
very effective first lines of
defence against poverty
for disadvantaged groups.
The Multi-Sectoral Committee
for Food Security and Poverty
Reduction (MFSPR) has
adopted the concept of
inclusive growth, defined as
growth that improves income
across all income groups,
including the poor.
Helena Ribe, David Robalino
and Ian Walker (2010). Achieving Effective
Social Protection for All in Latin America and
the Caribbean. From Right to Reality.
Washington, DC, World Bank.
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outsources significant social care
services to the non-governmental
sector. The country also has a traditional,
informal safety net that has been eroded
as the population has become
more urbanised.
Funding and the Role of
International Organisations
SSNs are funded from government
revenues. They target a large
population, and in the interests
of sustainability there is need to
refocus spending on them, as well as
to strengthen data collection and
analysis for SSN purposes.
Better data analysis and the
ability to monitor and evaluate
programmes would go a long way
towards creating fiscal space and
improving the financial management
of social protection programmes.
International and multilateral
organisations also have a significant
role to play in strengthening
implementation and monitoring
capacity. The following areas
would be of particular interest.
Developing credible poverty monitoring
and information systems.
A major weakness in Botswana’s
quest to eradicate poverty can be
traced to defects in the measurement,
monitoring and analysis of poverty.
Poverty estimates are only available
for three years in three decades.
No credible systematic projections
are available for the years for which
data are not available. In addition,
Botswana has not developed ways of
systematically measuring the
impact of its poverty policies and
programmes. Good poverty monitoring
and information systems are necessary
to monitor trends in poverty, its drivers,
and its responses to interventions.
The monitoring and evaluation system
would also cover social protection
programmes. Cooperating partners
would therefore be instrumental in
developing a web-enabled poverty
database and a poverty-data
archiving system.
Strengthening capacity to identify and
develop tools and key policies that drive
poverty eradication.
Among other things, this would
include: paying more attention to those
policies and programmes that have
the greatest actual or potential
influence on poverty; identifying
the policy gaps and taking measures
to fill them; reviewing (as appropriate)
and harmonising policies to ensure
the greater internal coherence, efficiency
and effectiveness of the government’s
response to poverty; and aligning anti-
poverty policies and programmes with
the broader macroeconomic framework
and the country’s absorptive capacity.
Development partners would be crucial
in helping the government appreciate
best practices in the design of good
policies and social protection systems.
Strengthening institutional coordination.
Structures responsible for coordinating
the implementation of poverty policies
need to be strengthened so that they
can perform better oversight.
Strengthening institutional capacity to
respond to poverty.
Successful implementation of this
package of measures requires adequate
capacities in the responsible institutions.
Currently, there are gaps at different
levels with respect to policy analysis
and formulation, data management and
analysis, monitoring and reporting.
This includes but is not limited to
capacity in terms of numbers
and the skills set.
How to Enhance the Dialogue between
the Ministry of Finance and Development
Planning and Social Services Agencies?
In 2003, the government  adopted
the National Strategy for Poverty
Reduction (NSPR), whose overarching
goal is to reduce poverty. The strategy
provides the policy and implementation
framework for meeting the Millennium
Development Goals and the ideals
expressed in “Vision 2016”.
The strategic pathways for poverty
reduction charted in the NSPR include:
promoting broad-based growth;
enhancing the human capabilities
of the poor (improving access to
basic quality education, healthcare
and nutrition for the poor); promoting
cost-effective, pro-poor social safety
nets; better response to the HIV and
AIDS epidemic (reducing the aggravating
effect of the disease on employment
and productivity, disease burden and
health costs, and vulnerability to
poverty); the inclusion/participation
of the poor in the development
process through decentralised planning
with greater local-government capacity
to provide for poverty reduction at the
local level; and strengthening national
development management capacity
for effective poverty reduction.
Through the Rural Development
Council, supported by the Multi-Sectoral
Committee for Food Security and Poverty
Reduction (MFSPR) and the Secretariat
in the Ministry of Finance and
Development Planning, the government
supervises the implementation of the
NSPR, including the coordination,
monitoring and evaluation of
different poverty alleviation policies
and programmes.
The MFSPR comprises all relevant
government ministries and
the private sector, including
non-governmental organisations
and community-based organisations.
The MFSPR has adopted the concept
of inclusive growth, defined as growth
that improves income across all income
groups, including the poor. There is
evidence that people at the lower
end of the income distribution
have little income growth.
The MFSPR has decided
to promote inclusive
growth by mainstreaming
poverty reduction into
the national
development plan.
One of the areas currently
under review is social
protection policy, which
should be consistent
with inclusive growth.
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Hence inclusive growth has not yet been
realised. The MFSPR has decided to
promote inclusive growth by
mainstreaming poverty reduction
into the national development plan.
To that end, the Ministry of Finance
and Development Planning has begun
to review the country’s past policies
and performance, and is learning from
international experiences to develop
future strategies.
One of the areas currently under review
is social protection policy and practice,
with a view to developing a social
protection policy that is consistent with
inclusive growth. A goal is to develop
guiding principles for mainstreaming
social protection into the National
Development Framework. This should
improve dialogue between the Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning
and the ministry responsible for
social services.
Identifying the Fiscal Space for
Social Protection in a Productive
Public Dialogue
Generally, the debt burden reduces
fiscal space. But debt in Botswana
is not a major challenge. As regards
spending on social protection, in 2002/03
government social spending averaged
just over 17,000 Botswana pulas (BWP) per
household (about US$3,400) (MFDP, 2010).
This is quite significant relative to
the income of the poor. It is therefore
imperative to identify the fiscal space
for social protection. In Botswana,
the following are possibilities.
 Efficiency in tax collection.
Subject to all other considerations,
the government should identify
and responsibly use all revenue
sources or tax bases effectively.
This could be achieved by
strengthening monitoring
to minimise tax evasion.
 Involvement of strategic partners.
The government should creatively
engage other players, such
as the private sector, to shoulder
the burden of social protection.
Evidence is emerging of the contribution
of scalable social protection programmes
to macroeconomic resilience.
This can help secure further political
support to increase fiscal space for social
protection programmes. The government
has adopted a three-pronged approach
to poverty reduction, as follows.
 Promotion of broad-based economic
growth by introducing economic
incentives for job creation, income
generation, citizen economic
empowerment and entrepreneurial
development.
 Investment in public infrastructure
and social services to enhance
human capabilities.
 Adoption of SSNs to target the
poor and vulnerable groups.
Within the limits of government capacity,
Botswana has a fairly good social
protection programme except for issues
of coverage, duplication and targeting,
which call for rationalisation to improve
efficiency. Despite that, social protection
programmes have clearly contributed
to the reduction of poverty and the
management risk: they reduce poverty
and inequality directly; they allow
households to invest for the future; they
contribute to household risk management;
and they allow the government to
implement important policy reforms.
Major Challenges Facing SSNs
in Botswana
The challenges identified by the Ministry
of Finance and Development Planning’s
public expenditure review include
the following:
 Better information is needed to
identify the poor and to assess
the impact of SSN programmes.
Identifying the poor and their
characteristics is a first step towards
the design of appropriate SSNs,
but information on this is sorely
lacking in Botswana.
 Improved targeting of beneficiaries
would increase the efficiency
and effectiveness of SSNs.
Targeting efficiency is an imperative.
Botswana’s safety net would be
improved if it could cover more of
the poorest. Few benefits target the
poor as a broad group.
Some programmes are universal and
not means-tested in any way; others
benefit only a very specific subgroup
of the poor.
There are three large universal/
categorical programmes which,
by definition, benefit far more
of the non-poor than the poor.
These are the old age pension, the
orphan benefit and school feeding.
All of these programmes would
benefit from better targeting.
But if the SSN budget is to remain
constant, the only way to ensure that
SSNs reach the poorest is to institute
targeting in untargeted programmes.
 Reaching the poor at a reasonable cost.
There is a need to use appropriate
packages.
 Planning, budgeting and
monitoring for service delivery.
This calls for comprehensive
monitoring and evaluation systems.
Botswana, like other countries,
has realised that ensuring poor
people have a life of dignity begins
with adequate provision for their basic
needs, including food, healthcare, shelter,
clothing, and protection from man-made
and natural disasters. Thus pro-growth
SSNs are part of the government’s
strategy to eradicate poverty. 
Coady, C. P. (2004). ‘Designing and
Evaluating Social Safety Nets: Theory,
Evidence and    Policy Conclusions’, FCND
Discussion Paper 172. Washington, DC, IFPRI.
MFDP (2006). Consultancy on the Review
of Social Safety Nets, Gaborone, MFDP.
MFDP (2007). Annual Poverty Monitoring
Report 2006/7. Gaborone, MFDP.
MFDP (2008). Annual Poverty Monitoring
Report 2007/8. Gaborone, MFDP.
MFDP (2010). Botswana Public Expenditure
Review. Gaborone, MFDP.
Seleka T. B. et al. (2007). Social Safety Nets
in Botswana: Administration, Targeting
and  Sustainability. Gaborone, Botswana
Institute for Development Policy Analysis.
There is evidence that
people at the lower end
of the income distribution
have little income growth.
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“Demographic Social
Protection” (DSP) is the
set of mechanisms and
relations determined chiefly
by the components of
demographic change, such
as the vital rates (crude
death and birth rates), age
structure, infant mortality
and life expectancy.
The current social protection
framework stands on
its own, thanks to the
goodwill of some dedicated
public employees and their
international partners, but
in general those with power
do not pay attention to the
implications of the current
phase of Mozambique’s
demographic transition.
Having too many children was for a long
time, and still is today, the main form of
social protection in Mozambique and,
perhaps, in most Sub-Saharan African
countries. But whenever this idea is
raised in meetings on social protection, it
generates mixed reactions. The latest, at a
workshop of the International Policy
Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) in
Johannesburg on 11–14 October 2010,
was no exception.
This article briefly qualifies the argument
about the idea of having too many
children, as part of what is termed
here “demographic social protection”
(DSP)—that is, the set of mechanisms
and relations determined chiefly by the
components of demographic change,
such as the vital rates (crude death and
birth rates), age structure, infant mortality
and life expectancy. After finishing this
text, readers will probably have more
unanswered questions than before,
but the purpose of the article is to
further the debate about DSP relative
to financial social protection (FSP).
In Mozambique, it has become
increasingly tricky to address the
challenges of scaling up social protection
programmes. Through the lens of wishful
thinking we would find no major
difficulty in accepting IPC-IG’s assertion
(IPC-IG, 2010) about Mozambique’s
successful social protection programmes:
“Beyond Southern Africa, Mozambique,
Ghana and Kenya have also been
successful in developing social protection
frameworks, and/or otherwise moving
towards giving a longer-term perspective
to their policies and programmes.”
Nevertheless, a closer look at the
real challenges of scaling up social
protection shows how difficult this
task now is. It is to be hoped that recent
events in Mozambique will facilitate
by António Francisco,
Rosimina Ali and Yasfir Ibraimo,
Instituto de Estudos Sociais
e Económicos (IESE),
Maputo
Financial versus Demographic
Social Protection in
Mozambique
policy dialogue—if not with all the main
power-holders, then at least with those
who are more prone to acknowledge
the danger of neglecting realistic
and critical thinking.
September 2010 was a terrible month
for Mozambique’s wishful thinkers.
The month began with another violent
and bloody popular uprising on 1–3
September in the two major cities
(Maputo and Matola), and finished
with the devastating revelation against
the widespread claim that poverty
has declined. Indeed, according to
latest National Assessment, poverty
has stagnated at best, while in several
provinces and the overall rural region it
has increased (MPD, 2010).
Context of the Social Protection Debate
The context of the current social
protection debate can be framed in three
strands: analytical, empirical, and the
missing debate. An important feature
in the analytical debate is the continuing
divide between the ways in which social
protection is dealt with in developed
countries and the approaches applied
to the developing world.
In the developed countries, researchers
and policymakers are currently busy
rethinking social insurance and social
assistance over the long run, with a view
to making them feasible, sustainable and
consistent with local demographic
and economic conditions.
In developing countries like
Mozambique, the assistance-based
approach has taken the lead in the
mainstream discourse on social
protection. The very idea of social
protection is generally used as an
“umbrella concept” or a proxy for
social assistance (both as a right
or mere charity) aimed at alleviating
Poverty in Focus    11
poverty and managing risks in poor
and vulnerable communities.
Some critics set their alternatives to the
assistance-based approaches within
the debate about choosing between
ex-ante and ex-post approaches, or
between short-term expediency and
the long-term consequences of different
social protection strategies (Wuyts, 2006).
Here, however, social protection is
defined in terms of the epistemological
stance set by its ultimate goal.
Thus social protection is the system
of mechanisms, relations and initiatives
aimed at ensuring an increasingly
dignifying human security, by gradually
freeing citizens from two main types of
fears in the human life cycle:
 freedom from want—namely,
shortage of food, employment or
professional opportunities, structural
or accidental; and
 freedom from aggression,
deprivation and threat to physical
and psychological security
(UNDP, 1994; Francisco, 2010).
As for the empirical context of the
debate on social protection, it is worth
remembering that Mozambique is among
the 12 countries in the world with the
greatest intensity and incidence of
poverty, as measured by the recently
developed Multidimensional Poverty
Index (MPI) (Alkire  and Santos, 2010).
With about 80 per cent of the country’s
population classified as poor in MPI terms,
this new poverty measure falls within
the range of the two most common
international indicators of “extreme”
poverty: 75 per cent of the population
living on US$1.25 or less a day and
90 per cent living on US$2 or less a day.
This stock of about 18 million people
in acute poverty is about 5 million
more than the estimate derived from
the national poverty lines: 54 per cent in
2003 and 55 per cent in 2009 (MPD, 2010).
With regard to the missing debate,
the important issue concerns the
failure to acknowledge the nature
of the Mozambican state and
national economy. Francisco (2010)
has characterised Mozambique as a
bankrupt state but not a failed one,
resting on a “bazaar economy”—an
economy submerged in a complex bazaar
of multiple economic universes with their
own relative independent rationality.
Financial Social Protection
The current literature on social protection
on developing countries takes for
granted that the viability and
sustainability of modern social
protection systems depend mainly
on the robustness, effectiveness and
efficiency of existing financial systems.
The literature, however, fails to
acknowledge that present-day financial
systems in countries like Mozambique
offer access to less than 25 per cent of
the adult population (De Vletter et al., 2009).
In other words, while a huge supply of
capital is flowing into the financial
system, about 80 per cent of the adult
population remains unattended and
excluded from the system. The two sides
of the market do not connect, even
though both parties need each other.
In these circumstances, how could formal
social security and social assistance
become more inclusive and socially
relevant for most of the population?
No wonder that the total allocation
for social security and social assistance
programmes is less than 0.5 per cent of
overall budget expenditure. Less than 10
per cent of more than 10 million people
in the economically active population
have access to formal social protection,
including contributory and non-
contributory systems.
Against this background the following
question is unavoidable: if the national
financial system on which the formal and
informal social protection mechanisms
are based covers less than a quarter of
the population, where do the remaining
three-quarters who are excluded from
the existing system seek social
protection? Are they really wholly
unprotected in terms of child support
and insurance for the elderly?
Demographic Social Protection
The short answer to the two questions
posed above can be provided by
considering DSP, as defined above.
More than two-thirds of the population
do not use any financial mechanisms,
including informal methods such as
xitique and community associations,
in their struggle for survival. Instead, in
everyday life, preventing and mitigating
the main risks, such as the risk of death
in childhood (before one or five years old)
continues to depend on DSP.
In Mozambique, therefore, one of the
latecomers to the demographic transition
in sub-Saharan Africa, having children
remains the main form of social
protection for most of the population.
Mozambique’s demographic transition is
slow and somewhat lagging compared to
neighbouring Southern African countries
such as Mauritius, Botswana and South
Africa (Francisco, 2010; Malmberg, 2008).
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, the
current demographic age transition in
Mozambique has several characteristics:
 consumption needs tend to exceed
productive capacity;
 the abundance of children is closely
related to high rate of child labour
and poverty levels;
 a strong dependence on the
exploitation of natural resources
and dependence on foreign capital;
 women have to invest substantial
productive and temporal resources
in reproduction; and
 there is a continued reliance on
having many children, since the
modern financial systems are not
replacing the old, intergenerational
wealth flows.
Scaling Up and Consolidation of … What?
The rest of this article responds to four
key questions and links the answers
to the views outlined above, with a
particular focus on the implications
of FSP and DSP.
How are decisions made about
what should be scaled up?
Much depends on the analytical and
methodological approaches, and on
the motivations of the researchers and
policymakers. Since 2007 the government
has approved a set of laws, regulations
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and even, earlier this year, a national
strategy on social protection. But the
overall legal framework leaves much to
be desired because of the failure to pay
adequate attention to the nature of the
demography, the economy and the state.
The current legal framework stands on its
own, thanks to the goodwill of some
dedicated public employees and their
international partners, but in general
those with power do not pay attention
to the implications of the current phase
of Mozambique’s demographic transition.
What are some of the
institutional constraints?
The present government has no
adequate strategy to overcome the
economic and financial bankruptcy in
which the state has lived for more than
25 years. Specific and dispersed social
assistance programmes, which depend
very much on international aid, are likely
to provide some relief in urgent
circumstances, considering the lack of
anything better. But even this relief will
have little impact if the aid comes to
empower those who are already power-
holders more than those who are really
powerless and in most need of help.
What are some of the institutional
opportunities? The most relevant
opportunity has been the willingness of
the international community to donate
and provide help, but for how long
will this continue? The current stage
of Mozambique’s demographic transition
could pay good dividends in the future,
but to that end the economic and
political institutions need to be
improved substantially.
As regards scaling up, it is important
to take account of the nature of the state
and the economy. The present institutional
setting leads to rather precarious forms
of social protection, including the broad
and macro security forms provided
through international aid to secure
urban public workers, and the state’s
monopoly on land property rights—
allegedly to provide security to the rural
population. Most needed, however, are
feasible and sustainable modern
institutional mechanisms that seek to
foster healthy social protection settings,
which can replace the old by new and
dignifying forms of survival, insurance
for the elderly, and prevention against
risks, taking account of the dynamics
of demographic social protection. 
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Addressing
Rural Poverty in Malawi:
The Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme
In Malawi, agriculture is not only
important for rural livelihoods but also
plays a significant role in the national
economy. About 35–39 per cent of GDP
and 90 per cent of foreign exchange
earnings originate in the agricultural
sector. Maize is the main staple food
crop and is largely grown by smallholder
farmers for subsistence consumption.
It is estimated that only 15 per cent of
the maize is marketed and the rest is for
own consumption. It is further estimated
that almost 50 per cent of smallholder
farmers own less than 1 hectare of land.
More than 70 per cent of cultivatable
land is under maize cultivation, and
about 97 per cent of smallholder farmers
grow maize under rain-fed continuous
cultivation methods. Almost half of
the smallholder farmers are also
net buyers of maize.
Extent of Vulnerability
In the past, Malawi has experienced
recurring food insecurity problems
at national and household levels.
Maize prices have been highly volatile,
increasing the vulnerability of smallholder
by Ephraim W. Chirwa, Wadonda Consult and  University of
Malawi and Andrew Dorward, SOAS, University of London
The challenges in social
protection in Malawi include
the fact that access is not
“rights-based”, there is lack of
appropriate legislation, lack
of coordination of various
programmes implemented by
various agencies, problems of
identifying beneficiaries and
high targeting errors.
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farmers who purchase maize after their
own production runs out. Continuous
cultivation has also brought about
declining soil fertility, and increases in
the price of fertilisers have reduced their
use by poor smallholders. Because of
unstable prices and limited access to
agricultural credit, producer investment is
low and consumers are “locked into” low-
productivity maize. These circumstances
in turn lower the productivity of
agricultural land and labour, resulting
in low and vulnerable incomes.
These conditions reinforce each other
and smallholder farmers become locked
into a low agricultural productivity trap
(Dorward and Chirwa, forthcoming).
Poverty and vulnerability remain
challenges in agriculture-based
livelihoods in Malawi. In 2005, it was
estimated that 52 per cent of Malawians
were living below the poverty line and
about 95 per cent experience economic
shocks that were mainly related to
problems in agriculture (NSO, 2005).
The extent of poverty and vulnerability
in Malawi demonstrates that a high
proportion of households are potential
candidates for social protection
interventions. Since 1995, the government
has been expressing the need to help
vulnerable groups as a strategy of
poverty reduction; in the Malawi Growth
and Development Strategy (MGDS),
social protection is one of the four
pillars of development.
Social protection programmes
are not specifically provided for in
the constitution or in specific laws,
as in other African countries, and their
implementation stems from national
development strategies that have
less binding budgetary provisions
for the government. Social protection
programmes, therefore, are
not rights-based.
Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme
The agricultural input subsidy
programme, now known as the
Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP),
was first implemented in 2005–2006 to
improve national and household-level
food security by broadening access
to and the use of inorganic fertilisers
among resource-poor households.
Initially, the FISP subsidised improved
maize seeds and fertilisers for both maize
and tobacco. Since the 2009–2010 season,
however, the programme has only
focused on subsidising fertilisers for
maize and improved maize seeds.
It is intended to target poor and
vulnerable smallholder farmers, giving
special consideration to vulnerable
groups (female/elderly-headed
households, orphans, affected by HIV and
AIDS). The programme is implemented
through a system of vouchers or
coupons. Each beneficiary household
receives two fertiliser coupons for one
50kg-bag of  basal and one 50kg-bag
of urea, as well as a maize seed coupon.
Dorward and Chirwa (2011) report
marked improvements in targeting from
2006/7 to 2008/9, although considerable
challenges remain.
The FISP is implemented in all districts
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security. Implementation calls for very
challenging coordination among
and by different stakeholders to deliver
the inputs to smallholder farmers in a
timely manner, and has coped with great
logistical challenges. The implementation
processes include planning and
budgeting, procuring inputs, registering
farmers, identifying beneficiaries,
printing secure coupons, distributing and
allocating coupons, coupon redemption
and control, and facilitating payments.
Estimates of the number of FISP
beneficiaries have varied between years
with programme size, and depend on
varying estimates of the farming
population. The Ministry of Agriculture
has targeted 1.5 to 1.7 million farming
households in recent years and the
programme is mainly funded from
the national budget. Although donors
provide direct budget support, they
have provided direct funding for only
a relatively small part of programme
costs (between 0 and 14 per cent
from 2005/6 to 2008/9).
The table shows the trends in the
scale of the programme since the 2005/6
agricultural season. The amount of
subsidised fertilisers has ranged from
131,400 to 216,600 metric tons and the
cost rose significantly in the 2008/9
season because of substantial increases
in the international prices of fertilisers.
This also spurred increases in overall
programme costs, but reductions in
both fertiliser prices and the quantities
disbursed yielded large cost reductions
in 2009/10. Using the coupon, smallholder
farmers pay a fixed price for a bag of
Coverage, Size and Costs of FISP, 2005/6–2009/10
Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2011), 2009/10 data from Logistics Unit (2010).
Households receiving > = 1 fertiliser coupons n.a 54% 59% 65% n/a
Total fertiliser sales (metric tons) 131,388 174,688 216,553 202,278 161,495
Fertiliser cost ($US/metric tons) 393 490 590 1250 614
Subsidy % (of commercial price) 64% 72% 79% 91% 88%
Programme cost, net (US$ million) 32 73.9 95.4 241.7 109.9
  2005/6                     2006/7                  2007/8                  2008/9                   2009/10
Poverty and vulnerability
remain challenges in
agriculture-based
livelihoods in Malawi.
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subsidies on rural livelihoods more
broadly suggests real income increases
of 10–100 per cent among poor
beneficiary households, compared to
increases of up to 20 per cent for poor
non-beneficiary households.
It is important to note, however, that
these positive impacts have occurred in
a period also marked by high tobacco
prices, macroeconomic stabilisation
and good weather.
The financial and economic burden is
enormous: huge resources are required if
all poor and vulnerable households are
to be reached through very large-scale
programmes. The agricultural subsidies
are funded mainly by the government.
This raises the problem of the fiscal
sustainability of social protection
programmes. The input subsidy alone
amounted to 2.1 per cent of GDP or 6 per
cent of the national budget in 2005/6.
With increases in international fertiliser
prices, the subsidy rose to 6.6 per cent
of GDP or 16 per cent of the national
budget in 2008/9.
The figure illustrates the challenges of
managing the cost of such a large-scale
social protection programme in Malawi.
Except for fiscal years 2005/6 and 2009/10,
actual estimated expenditures have
substantially exceeded the budgeted
expenditures, and the very high fertiliser
prices of 2008/9 made the programme’s
significant cost-overrun particularly
problematic. This shows that if social
protection programmes are not well
targeted and managed, they can be
fiscally unsustainable.
The other challenges in social protection
include the fact that access is not
“rights-based”, the lack of appropriate
legislation, lack of coordination of
various programmes implemented by
various agencies, problems of identifying
beneficiaries, high targeting errors,
and determining benefits and the
duration of access.
There are synergies and trade-offs
in designing and implementing
programmes to address both growth
and social protection objectives.
These are illustrated by the FISP, where
targeting subsidised inputs at the most
needy and vulnerable (for example, those
without land and/or labour) may make
the initiatives less beneficial to those
households than cash transfers, and less
productive than inputs for slightly less
poor households with some land and
labour that can use the input effectively.
Questions then arise about the
coordinated design and implementation
of complementary programmes, with
cash transfers replacing or supplementing
input subsidies for the land- and labour-
poor and the cash-poor, respectively.
Despite these difficulties, however, the
programme demonstrates that political,
technical and budgetary commitment
to implementing large-scale and
fundamentally appropriate programmes
can substantially improve the welfare of
poor and vulnerable households, and
can contribute to longer-term processes
of broad-based, inclusive development
and economic growth.
Conclusion
Social protection interventions can
play a positive role in promoting
agriculture-based livelihoods in Malawi.
Such interventions are contributing to
household food security, higher incomes,
and improved health and education
outcomes. Given the high incidence
of poverty and vulnerability, however,
significant resources are required to
cover as many beneficiaries as possible.
fertiliser and maize seeds. The extent
of the subsidisation of the commercial
price of fertilisers has ranged from 64 per
cent in 2005/6 to 91 per cent in 2008/9.
The immediate impact of the
agricultural input subsidy is the
incremental production in maize,
the main staple food for Malawians.
Estimated incremental maize production
during the subsidy years 2005/6 to 2008/9
above the average of 2002/03 and 2003/4
agricultural seasons ranges from 273,000
to 836,000 metric tons, using the
incremental fertilisers and maize-
nitrogen response rate. But estimates
provided by the Ministry of Agriculture
and Food Security show incremental
production ranges from 975,000 to
2,031,00 metric tons. Nonetheless,
both estimates show that maize
production increased substantially
following the implementation of
the input subsidy programme.
Additionally, field studies reveal greater
village maize availability and a lack of
evidence of food shortages, despite high
prices following the 2007/8 agricultural
season. There is also evidence of
significant increases in nominal wage
rates from 2005/6, greater than the later
maize prices rises. Unsurprisingly, poverty
incidence estimates have fallen from 52
per cent in 2004/5 to 40 per cent in 2007/8
and 2008/9 (NSO 2010). Indicative
modelling of the impact of input
Source: Dorward and Chirwa (2011); 2009/10 data from Logistics Unit (2010).
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Additionally, challenges have to be
addressed in order to enhance the social
protection impacts on poverty and
rural livelihoods. 
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While ever more African countries
are piloting cash transfer schemes,
Namibia is one of only a few with a
long history of state provision of social
grants to needy population groups.
This is linked to the country’s past
annexation into Apartheid South Africa,
where cash transfers were initially
intended to protect the “white”
population. Now, Namibia is rapidly
scaling up its system and as one of the
oldest cash transfer systems in Africa
faces a set of new challenges.
Around the time of independence in
1990, there were 53,000 recipients of the
old age pension (payable to all citizens
over 60 living in Namibia) and the
disability pension (payable on medical
certification of a disability). By early 2010
this number had almost trebled to
156,000 recipients. Moreover, those
receiving a subvention for veterans
of the liberation struggle now number
almost 2,000. But most remarkable has
been the recent expansion in access to
the child maintenance grant (payable
to mainly orphaned children under
18 whose caregiver’s income is less
than N$1000 or US$125 a month)
and the foster parent grant (payable
to individuals who are given custody
of child though the court system).
The number of people receiving these
child grants has increased more than
tenfold in just a few years: from fewer
than 10,000 in early 2003 to close to
120,000 today. About 13 per cent of the
total population of just over 2 million
people now receives some form
of social grant.
This impressive increase has been
achieved through a combination of
better administration, awareness-raising
in underserved communities and,
especially, targeting vulnerable children
receiving food aid.
The poverty-reduction impacts are likely
to be sizeable. New baseline estimates
based on survey data from 2003/2004
suggest that even before the latest
expansion of the child grants, the direct
impact of the social transfers was to
lower the national incidence of poverty
from 26 per cent to 22 per cent, or by
almost a quarter (Levine et al., 2009).
The impact on the poverty gap and
severity of poverty were even greater:
they fell by 35 per cent and 45 per cent,
respectively. This indicates the
effectiveness of the social grants in
reaching the poorest of the poor
households, even if the grant itself
is not enough to lift the household
above the poverty line.
Further analysis of the survey data also
reveals that 74 per cent of age-eligible
people in the top quintile received the
old age pension, compared to 87 per cent
of the age-eligible among the poorest
20 per cent of the population (see the
figure). But only 13 per cent of age-
eligible children living in single-parent
by Sebastian Levine, United Nations
Development Programme, UgandaNew Challenges
of Cash Transfers in Namibia
In Namibia, the number of
people receiving child grants
has increased more than
tenfold in just a few years:
from fewer than 10,000 in
early 2003 to close to
120,000 today.
About 13 per cent of the
total population of just over
2 million people now receives
some form of social grant.
New baseline estimates
based on survey data from
2003/2004 suggest that even
before the latest expansion
of the child grants, the direct
impact of the social transfers
was to lower the national
incidence of poverty from
26 per cent to 22 per cent,
or by almost a quarter
(Levine et al., 2009).
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households received child grants.
Despite the official means test, there
was no evidence that the grants are
targeted at poorer households in
the group eligible by other criteria.
Access to the grant is low in all quintiles
but it seems to peak as a proportion of
the age-eligible in the middle quintile
at 15 per cent.
Targeting poor households is found to
have stemmed less from means testing
than from how the child grant targets
orphans, who are disproportionately
represented in poor households, and
from the fact that some age-eligible
among the non-poor appear to have
opted out of the universal social
pensions system. While the effectiveness
of the means test for the child grant is
questionable, the targeting of the grant
is likely to improve as the recent scale-up
has focused on improving uptake
in the northern areas. That is where
most of the poor live, and where
the population was excluded from
social grants during the apartheid era.
Despite their strong positive effects
on poverty, the social grants are less
effective in reducing Namibia’s extremely
high level of inequality. This is
particularly relevant in a country whose
Gini coefficient was 0.6 in 2003/2004,
indicating one of world’s most unequal
distributions of monetary welfare.
This is unsurprising, however, given
the overall magnitude of the grants
compared to other sources of income
in the economy. But it is important to
keep this in mind when setting social
policy objectives and in shaping
expectations of what the social
grants can realistically achieve.
The country’s social protection system
faces a series of new challenges that will
have to be addressed in order to ensure
sustainability and effectiveness.
These challenges include:
 Develop an overarching policy for
social protection, which should also
define more clearly the objectives of
the cash transfer system, establish its
development priority, and develop
policy linkages. Given Namibia’s
extreme level of inequality, making
growth pro-poor and inclusive is a
particularly pressing challenge.
Hence the need to embed the
national social protection policy
within the overall National
Development Plan (NDP).
 Set clearer targets. A target of the
NDP, for instance, is near-universality
for uptake of the old age pension,
whereas the Poverty Reduction
Strategy and the National Pension
Act provide for the introduction
of means-testing to reduce uptake
among the less needy.
 Strengthen coordination and capacity
among implementers—for example,
to avoid double payment of social
pensions, subventions and grants—
and improve access and delivery in
hard-to-reach areas and for excluded
social groups.
 Determine the appropriate level and
increments of the grants. This is likely
to include a one-time increase in the
child grants to allow them to “catch
up” to other grants. The real value
of the child grants has still fallen
significantly over recent decades
and has not kept up with the
social pensions.
 Reassess the suitability of the means
test for the child maintenance
grant, specifically its reference to
applicants’ income rather than
the socioeconomic status of the
household. Reassess the eligibility
criteria for the maintenance grant,
notably the exclusion of poor and
vulnerable children who have both
parents living but who may be as
needy as currently eligible children.
 Explore alternatives to ex-ante means
testing of the old age pension—for
example, using the tax system to claw
back the pension or penalise high-
income recipients. Evidence from
South Africa does not lend support
to the introduction of a means test
for the old age pension in Namibia.
 Investigate the true administrative
costs of the cash transfer system,
Namibia needs to
strengthen coordination
and capacity among
implementers—for
example, to avoid
double payment of
social pensions,
subventions and grants—
and improve access and
delivery in hard-to-reach
areas and for excluded
social groups.
Source: Levine et al (2009).
* Among those age-eligible and child grants only single-parent households.
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so as to further assess the fiscal
sustainability and cost-effectiveness
of the system as a whole, and
means-testing in particular.
 Strengthen monitoring and
evaluation and invest in research,
for instance on the impact of the
secondary school “quasi”-conditionality,
the large exclusion errors of the
old age pension in certain regions,
the effects of social pensions and
grants on labour-force participation,
and other issues related to the
cash transfer system.
 Redesign the household income
and expenditure survey to better
capture incomes from social and
private transfers, including cash
grants and remittances.
Involve stakeholders in social
protection systems in the design,
execution and analysis of this key
national household survey.
 Explore alternative social protection
programmes geared to youths
and the unemployed, such as
public works programmes,
incentives for hiring labour
and employment guarantees.
Levine, S., S. van der Berg and D. Yu, (2009).
‘Measuring the Impact of Social Cash
Transfers on Poverty and Inequality in
Namibia,’ Stellenbosch Economic Working
Papers 25/09. Stellenbosch University and
Bureau for Economic Research.
Cash transfers in Indonesia were
initially implemented in 2005 as an
unconditional programme that sought to
ease the burden on the poor following a
sharp rise in fuel prices as a result of the
reduction in the government’s fuel
subsidy. The programme was heavily
criticised for its inability to help the poor
in the longer term, mistargeting, and the
alleged negative impact on people’s
behaviour, such as creating dependency
and laziness. It was terminated in 2009.
In mid 2007, the government launched
two pilot conditional cash transfer
programmes (CCTs): the household CCT
and community CCT. These have common
objectives and use the same list of 12
health and education indicators to assess
compliance, but they take different
approaches. This article discusses the
characteristics and implementation
of all the cash transfer programmes
that have been adopted in Indonesia.
Unconditional Cash Transfer
In March 2005, the government launched
an unpopular policy of gradually
reducing the fuel subsidy in an effort
to safeguard the national budget, since
the subsidy accounted for 3.5 per cent
of GDP in 2005. Six months later, after
another substantial reduction in the
subsidy, the government launched an
unconditional cash transfer programme
known as Direct Cash Transfer
(Bantuan Langsung Tunai, BLT). It sought
to compensate poor and nearly poor
households for the potential negative
impact of the increase in fuel prices.
Eligible households were identified
by statistics offices using a proxy
means testing methodology.
The numbers of targeted households
in 2005, 2008 and 2009 were 19.1 million,
19.02 million and 18.5 million, respectively
(Hastuti et al., 2009). The number
of recipients fell because of data
verification by the statistics offices
and because some targeted households
had ceased to be, changed address or
moved out of poverty.
Each recipient household received
a card containing personal data on the
household head (name and address, plus
a passport photograph). Beneficiaries
had to produce this card to collect the
funds at the nearby post offices. Every
beneficiary household received cash of
Rp100,000 per month (about US$11),
which was transferred quarterly.
The BLT programme was popular among
beneficiary households. One study by
university research centres revealed that
the programme was of significant help
to the poor, especially in a time of crisis
(Royat, 2009). Sumarto and Suryahadi (2010)
by Vita Feberiany,
SMERU Research Institute, JakartaThe Story of
Cash Transfers in Indonesia
In March 2005, the
government launched an
unpopular policy of gradually
reducing the fuel subsidy
in an effort to safeguard the
national budget, since
the subsidy accounted
for 3.5 per cent of
GDP in 2005.
Six months later, after
another substantial
reduction in the subsidy,
the government launched an
unconditional cash transfer
programme known as Direct
Cash Transfer (Bantuan
Langsung Tunai, BLT).
The Community Cash Transfer
Programme (Generasi)
provides block grants
to communities who must
commit to accept the 12
indicators as a condition
of their participation
in the programme.
The design is based
on community-driven
development principles,
whereby communities
decide how best
 to use grants through
participatory planning.
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have shown that while the subsidy cuts
would have increased poverty by 5.5 per
cent, the actual increase in poverty in
2005 was only 2 per cent as a result of
the programme.
Implementation of the BLT, however, was
opposed in several quarters, including
among members of parliament, various
non-governmental organisations and
university activists, and some political
parties. They argued that a direct cash
transfer programme cannot help poor
households over the longer term, and
cannot ensure that the poor will have
access to basic services such as
healthcare and education. The BLT
programme was terminated in 2009.
Conditional Cash Transfer
In mid 2007 the government launched
two CCTs: a household CCT known as
the Family Hope Programme (PKH) and
a community CCT known as the PNPM
for a Healthy and Clever Generation
(Generasi). The two programmes have
the same goals: to reduce poverty, reduce
maternal and child mortality, and ensure
universal coverage of basic education.
Both programmes apply the same 12
health and education indicators as a
means of achieving their objectives:
Health indicators:
1. Four prenatal care visits for
pregnant women.
2. Taking iron tablets during pregnancy.
3. Delivery assisted by a trained health
professional.
4. Two postnatal care visits.
5. Complete childhood immunisations.
6. Ensuring monthly weight increases
for infants.
7. Monthly weighing of children under
three and biannually for under-fives.
8. Vitamin A twice a year for under-fives.
Education indicators:
9. Primary school enrolment
of all children aged 6 to 12.
10. Minimum attendance rate of
85 per cent for all children
of primary-school age.
11. Junior secondary school enrolment
of children aged 13 to 15.
12. Minimum attendance rate of 85
per cent for all children of junior
secondary-school age.
Household cash transfer (PKH)
PKH’s design is similar to the CCT
programmes implemented in Latin
America. The programme is scheduled
to run until 2015 and is linked to the
planned achievement of the Millennium
Development Goals. It aims to reach
about 6.5 million poor households.
It is designed to support demand-side
improvements in education and health
services for poor households, so that
children from those households can
escape the inter-generational poverty
trap. The programme is managed
nationally by the Ministry for Social
Affairs and was initially implemented
in seven of Indonesia’s 33 provinces,
covering about 388,000 poor households.
By 2010, PKH had been extended to 20
provinces and 90 districts, covering some
800,000 households.
Like the BLT programme, the targeted
households in the PKH were chosen
by means testing, and in fact the initial
recipients were selected using the BLT
beneficiaries list. Eligible households
must meet one of the following
conditions: have a pregnant or lactating
mother; have a child under six years of
age; or have a child of primary or junior
secondary-school age. Unlike the BLT
programme, where the funds were
targeted at the heads of household
(who were male in almost all cases),
the funds must be transferred directly
to women in the household.
This may be the mother or another adult
female who takes care of the children in
the family. Women are believed to pay
more attention to the quality of
children’s health and education.
Every recipient household receives
a quarterly cash transfer distributed
through the local post office or its
mobile unit. The exact amount received
depends on the composition of the
household (see the table). The average
transfer is Rp1,390,000 per household per
year, which is about 16 per cent of the
annual income of very poor households
(Hicking, 2008). There are no restrictions
on to the use of the money.
To support the beneficiary households,
one facilitator is assigned to every
200–300 beneficiaries and every 25
beneficiaries comprise a group.
The facilitators’ main tasks include
mobilising beneficiaries, informing
them of their rights and obligations,
encouraging them to adopt and maintain
PKH practices, monitoring eligibility, and
updating household data (Hickling, 2008).
Health and education service providers
at the village level are responsible for
monitoring compliance according to
the 12 programme indicators. They are
required to report regularly to the
sub-district PKH management office.
If a household fails to comply with
these conditions, benefits are reduced:
after one month by Rp50,000; after two
months by Rp100,000; and after three
months full benefits are suspended.
Several problems have arisen during the
implementation of the PKH programme.
First, there are certain supply barriers
to the achievement of the objective.
The programme’s success depends on
the availability of health and education
services. Some poor villages in the areas
where PKH is being implemented still
have no access to midwives, while senior
secondary schools are too distant for
children to attend. Second, PKH is
a cash-constrained programme:
exclusion errors are inevitable, and
jealousy and potential conflicts have
been evident in some locations. Third,
PKH is also a demand-driven programme,
and insufficient attention is paid to
supply-side factors, particularly services
providers, results in poor compliance
monitoring by those providers.
The BLT programme
was popular among
beneficiary households.
One study by university
research centres revealed
that the programme was
of significant help to the
poor, especially in a time
of crisis (Royat, 2009).
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Community Cash Transfer (Generasi)
Generasi was launched at the same
time as PKH but has been implemented
in different regions. This programme
provides block grants to communities
who must commit to accept the
12 indicators as a condition of their
participation in the programme.
The design is based on community-
driven development principles, whereby
communities decide how best to use
grants through participatory planning.
The funds can be allocated to improving
either the supply or demand sides of
health and education services. In the
health sector, funds have been used to
subsidise delivery expenses, build village
health clinics, hire midwives or buy food
supplements for babies. In education,
funds have been used to buy books and
equipment, for scholarships, to hire
additional teachers or to build or
renovate classrooms.
The funds are transferred to a
joint account at the sub-district level,
on the basis of the population size
and the number of poor people in each
sub-district. In the programme’s first year,
the allocation per village was based on
the number of targeted beneficiaries in
each village, including the number of
children under six and those at primary
and secondary school, and the expected
number of pregnant women. In the
second year, 80 per cent of sub-districts
were divided among villages in
proportion to the number of target
beneficiaries. The other 20 per cent of the
funds were distributed among villages on
the basis of their performance according
to the 12 programme indicators (Olken et
al., 2010). The average allocation per
village in 2007 was about US$8,400, and
in 2009 the amount was almost twice that.
To support the programme, all villages
receive technical assistance in the form of
facilitators and training. Facilitators help
communities to plan and implement the
programme, and to measure achievement
of the 12 indicators. To monitor
indicators on children’s enrolment
and attendance at school, facilitators
collect data from the schools register.
To record compliance with health
indicators, coupons are issued for
each indicator (four coupons for
prenatal checks, two for postnatal and
so on). When beneficiaries visit the local
health centre, service providers stamp
the coupon according to the services
provided. These coupons are collected
by a programme facilitator and
reported to the sub-district’s
programme management.
Generasi initially covered 1,605 villages in
129 sub-districts, with a total budget of
US$20 million. In the second year, the
project expanded to cover 2,120 villages
in 176 sub-districts, with a total budget
of US$44 million. As distinct from PKH,
the Generasi programme is supervised
by the Ministry of Home Affairs and
partly funded with grants from the
embassy of the Netherlands and
loans from the World Bank. By design, as
a community cash transfer, Generasi has
been able to avoid problems such as
those that have arisen in the PKH
household transfer, particularly problems
of supply barriers (because funds can
also be allocated for infrastructure and
service providers) and exclusion errors
(because the beneficiaries were selected
at the village level). Nevertheless, this
programme is prone to elite capture and
corruption. Because of educational gaps
and economic inequality between village
elites, programme implementers and the
poor, the decision making process is
easily influenced by the interests
of those with more power.
Conclusion
Conditional cash transfer has an important
element that balances protection and
opportunity: it helps the poor cope with
current poverty, while at the same time
it promotes movement out of poverty
by encouraging human capital formation
and improving economic opportunities
for the poor. Nevertheless, CCTs alone are
not enough to ensure that as few people
as possible fall into or remain in poverty.
CCTs should be part of a comprehensive
social protection that includes protective
social assistance such as disability benefit
and an old age pension, preventative
measures such as public works schemes,
and promotional programmes that have a
positive impact on human development
and economic opportunity. 
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Transfer Scenarios
Source: PKH General Guidelines, 2007.
Note: US$1 = Rp9,000.
Transfer scenario Transfer amount per poor family
per year (Rupiah = Rp)
Fixed transfer
Transfer for household with:
(i) Children aged under six and/or pregnant/
     lactating mother
(ii) Primary-school age children
(iii) Junior high-school age children
Average transfer per household
Minimum transfer per household
Maximum transfer per household
200,000
800,000
400,000
800,000
1,390,000
600,000
2,200,000
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The constitution of Timor-Leste
establishes that “every citizen is entitled
to social assistance and security in
accordance with the law” (Section 56,
Article 1).1 The government stipulates
that three groups are to be prioritised:
the elderly, women, and people in
situations of poverty and vulnerability.
The pension scheme for the elderly and
the disabled was formally defined in 2008.
The registry of beneficiaries started in
2007 and the first payment was made
in late 2008. The monthly pension for
both groups is US$30 and the payment is
to be made quarterly through deposits
in bank accounts. Because of operational
and infrastructural issues, however, the
payments have been processed only
twice a year and have been given
in cash to beneficiaries.
The social pension for the elderly is
universal and is not subjected to means
testing. Every citizen aged 60 or more
and living in Timor-Leste for at least a
year is eligible for the benefit. The social
pension for the disabled, similarly, is not
means-tested, and all citizens aged 18
years or more who have been living in
the country for more than a year are
potentially eligible. The additional
condition is “a physical or mental
disability that entails the complete and
definitive incapacity to undertake any
kind of labour activity”.
The number of beneficiaries has
increased since then from 72,300 to
82,000 in 2010. The management of
pensions for the elderly faces problems
related to the accuracy of data from the
beneficiaries. Currently, the single national
identity document is the “electoral card”
(EC). The Ministry of State Administration
and Territorial Organisation issued the EC
to replace the “identity card” (IC) that was
issued by the transitional government
(under United Nations leadership) for the
elections of 2000, when the constituent
assembly was chosen. The EC is supposed
to cover all of the population over the
age of 17 (or under 17 but married).
Despite the administrative and operational
problems facing the pension programmes
for the elderly and the disabled, it is the
most important current measure for
poverty reduction in Timor-Leste.
Together with the “cash for work” and
children/women grants programmes,
these social cash transfers are powerful
instruments of social protection and
poverty reduction.
Improving the Bolsa da Mãe Programme
The current framework. In the context
of the 2006–2007 crises, with a view to
promoting the government guidelines
on breaking the vicious cycle of inter-
generational poverty and promoting
human capital development for the
marginalised, the new government
decided to implement “conditional cash
transfer pilot programmes in the areas of
healthcare and education for the poorest
families, as they have been successfully
carried out in other countries.”2
Hence Bolsa da Mãe was developed by
the Directorate of Social Reinsertion
(DoSR) though a pilot project in 2008.
The programme “aims to support the
most vulnerable women and families
to finance access to education for their
children without a strong impact on
the household budget.”3
The programme was implemented
by establishing quotas of the same
amount by sub-districts (65 in total)
and educational levels (primary, pre-
secondary and secondary).4 But this
did not take account of differences
in population size, poverty levels and
educational levels among localities.
Local authorities (chiefs of sucos), in
partnership with technical staff in the
Ministry of Social Solidarity, identified the
beneficiaries. The potential beneficiaries
by Ricardo Dutra,
UNDP Consultant, Timor-Leste Improving the Design
of Bolsa da Mãe in
Timor-Leste
Bolsa da Mãe was developed
by the Directorate of Social
Reinsertion (DoSR) though
a pilot project in 2008.
The programme
“aims to support the
most vulnerable women and
families to finance access to
education for their children
without a strong impact on
the household budget.”
The revision of Bolsa da Mãe
builds on a long struggle
for change in a country
under reconstruction.
South-South learning
and cooperation have
been crucial in this process.
Bolsa da Mãe is being revised
largely on the basis of Brazil’s
experience with cash transfer
programmes and long-term
social protection frameworks.
1.  Article 2 of the same section stipulates that
“the state shall promote, in accordance with its
national resources, the establishment of a social
security system.“
2 and 3. Programme of the IV Constitutional
Government of Timor-Leste, 2007–2012.
4. Initially, the local authorities of each sub-district could
select and distribute 40 grants for each educational level.
5. The dimensions and sub-dimensions presented here
are a preliminary proposal. The vulnerabilities scale and
weights will be defined on the basis of specific studies
to be conducted with data collected by the 2010
census and the Social Protection Survey (MSS/WB),
also to be conducted in 2010.
6. This procedure is very important for targeting.
In a situation where quantitative information
about the actual number of vulnerable/poor families is
unavailable, this information will be based on the total
number of households per aldeia associated with a
qualitative assessment of the poverty level
of the aldeias.
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had to present documentation issued
by local authorities and schools.
Local authorities and ministry staff
also evaluated the candidates’ compliance
with the eligibility criteria. The main issues
facing the programme design, which led
to leakage and under-targeting, were:
 Overlapping between local leaders
and government staff in identifying
and certifying beneficiaries.
 Linear criteria adopted for a quota,
based on the territory and educational
profile of potential beneficiaries.
 Central government’s lack of capacity
to carry out systematic monitoring.
 Lack of a comprehensive and
measurable concept of vulnerability
and poverty.
Despite the government’s guidance on
the implementation of educational and
health conditionalities, only the former
were implemented. There are two main
problems with this arrangement. The first
is that only one or, in a limited number of
cases, two children can directly benefit
from the programme. This creates
perverse incentives that can lead families
to classify  children as “winners” and
“losers”: the winners are sent to school
and the losers are sent to work. The
second problem is that the current
design excludes children who have
previously dropped out of school or
who did not even start schooling.
The new framework. The revision of Bolsa
da Mãe builds on a long struggle for
change in a country under reconstruction.
South-South learning and cooperation
have been crucial in this process. Bolsa da
Mãe is being revised largely on the basis
of Brazil’s experience with cash transfer
programmes and long-term social
protection frameworks.
A project to improve the conceptual
framework of Bolsa da Mãe is under
development by the Ministry of Social
Development. The ideas presented below
are a partial result of that project.
The general objectives of the programme
were redefined:
 Short-term: immediate relief from
chronic and food poverty, ensuring
a minimum level of food and
nutritional security.
 Medium/long-term: breaking the
intergenerational cycle of poverty by
ensuring access to public education
and healthcare for children from
vulnerable families.
Under the new scheme the beneficiaries
will be identified by means of a
vulnerability scale encompassing
the following dimensions and
sub-dimensions:5
 Material poverty: captures income
and asset ownership.
 Capacity to provide livelihoods:
status of caregivers (single parents,
widowed, and so on), adults with
capacity to work, level of education.
 Demand for care: number of children
and young people, presence
of disability.
 Access to services: vaccination
status, status of school enrolment
for children and teenagers, level of
age-grade distortion at school.
Co-responsibilities
The concept of conditionality used in the
previous programme will be changed to
the concept of co-responsibility. This
means that, in addition to the obligations
regarding children’s education and health
assumed by the parent or caregiver, the
state also assumes responsibility for
creating and guaranteeing the provision
of services. If these services are not
accessible to the families, the benefits
should not be suspended or cancelled.
The co-responsibilities proposed for the
new programme are: school attendance
by children aged 6 to 14 and vaccination
of children aged 0 to 5.
Structure of benefits
The new programme will focus on
all children aged 0 to 14 in vulnerable
families, not just on one or two children
per family as is now the case. The benefits
structure should consider the budget
resources available and a lower limit
to encourage vulnerable/poor families to
join the programme, as well as an upper
limit that discourages opportunistic
behaviour by families that are less
vulnerable/poor. The period covered each
year by transfers will increase from the
current eight months to twelve months.
Time in the programme
The data on the beneficiary families
will be updated every two years or when
relevant information changes (such as
the death, marriage or divorce of a family
member). The registration of families
that are enrolled but not yet receiving
benefits (on the waiting list) will be
renewed every two years so that they
remain eligible for the programme.
Families that are in the programme and
those previously registered and eligible
will be re-classified each year using the
vulnerability scale, and those classified
as most vulnerable/poor will join the
programme or continue to take part in it.
Operational procedures
Targeting will be in three levels/stages:
(i) geographical, by setting quotas for
the territorial level of villages (aldeias);
(ii) classification of the families by
vulnerability level; and (iii) dissemination
of the pre-list of beneficiaries’ families at
the commune level (villages). There will
be a pre-defined and open process
for evaluating complaints.
Registration will comprise three
consecutive operational steps:
(i) re-registration of current beneficiary
families; (ii) spontaneous registration of
families; and (iii) registration of families
through an active search in remote areas
and areas where the benefit had
low coverage.
The third stage of registration will be
based on preliminary data from the 2010
census, analysis of which will lead to the
setting of quotas for aldeias.6 This third
step will be conducted through an active
search for the most vulnerable families in
remote areas. Families will be assessed
according to the vulnerability scale, and
the most vulnerable in each aldeia will be
included in the programme.
The chief assumption of this new
framework is that the territorial quotas
and the active search will significantly
reduce the intentional (clientelistic) and
unintentional (access-related) targeting
bias of the current programme.
Mechanisms for social accountability and
dealing with complaints are also under
discussion and will be included in the
design of the programme. 
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If we are looking for potential
drivers of change,parliaments
may prove to be a rich source.
A key aspect of
parliamentarians, which
makes them potentially
forceful champions of
change, is that in a mature
democratic system they
have a vested interest in
delivery and performance.
The debate on social
protection is dynamic,
but it is true to say that
national interest in
widespread social protection
in most lower-income
countries has not reached a
critical mass, and it is hard to
identify champions of the
cause within national
civil society.
This article appeals for more
resources to be devoted to promoting
policy uptake and argues that the critical
need in the “war against poverty” is not
more research but more attention to the
adoption of existing research findings
by policymakers. The article uses the
example of the social protection agenda
in southern Africa to investigate the
role of parliamentarians as a force
for policy change.
It highlights recent experience
from an (albeit limited) regional
initiative to strengthen the capacity of
parliamentarians and parliament staff in
order to enable them to better engage
in and ultimately drive national social
protection agendas.
Poverty and social protection
in southern Africa. Poverty reduction
remains the main economic, social and
political challenge facing southern Africa.
According to the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP),
only two of the thirteen “mainland”
southern African countries (South Africa
and Zambia) are considered “very likely”
to achieve the Millennium Development
Goal (MDG) of eradicating extreme
poverty and hunger.1 Indeed, there
must be doubt that even they will meet
the overly ambitious target of “achieving
full and productive employment and
decent work for all, including women
and young people.”2
In the 1990s, when the MDGs were set,
the conventional “war against poverty”
was fought on two fronts: development
assistance for economic growth was
viewed as the main means of ensuring
sustainable poverty reduction;
and humanitarian assistance,
mainly in the form of food aid, was
seen as the best way to alleviate poverty
Engaging Parliamentarians
in the Social
Protection Agenda
by John Rook,
Regional Hunger and
Vulnerability Programme,
Johannesburg
and protect those who were still to reap
the benefits of growth.
But the evidence, for southern Africa at
least, has shown that economic growth
alone has not been effective in reducing
poverty. In recent years, several countries
in the region (Malawi is a good case
in point) have registered respectable
economic growth rates but poverty
has remained stubbornly resistant.
Because of high rates of income
inequality (southern African countries
have some of the highest Gini
coefficient levels in the world),
most of the benefit from economic
growth has remained with the rich
elite and little has trickled down to the
impoverished masses. A common adage
is that 80 per cent of growth benefits
20 per cent of the population.
At the same time, growing concerns have
been expressed about the emphasis
on reactive, short-term humanitarian
interventions (especially food aid)
to meet the immediate needs of the
impoverished and the longer-term impact
that such poverty alleviation measures
were having on individual households’
ability to improve their livelihoods,
as well as on governments’ willingness
to embrace difficult policy reforms.
In this context more attention is being
paid today in southern Africa to the role
of social protection, especially social cash
transfers, as a simple and multifunctional
instrument that has preventative,
protective and promotive benefits
for targeted households. Perhaps
even more significantly, it has the
potential to generate wider pro-poor
economic growth.
The current challenge facing proponents
of social protection in southern Africa lies
1.  Surprisingly, given the importance attached to the
MDG initiative, the UNDP’s MDG Monitor states that
there is insufficient information to assess the
performance of four southern African countries
(Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Tanzania
and Zimbabwe).
2. The MDG of eradicating extreme poverty and
hunger includes three specific targets: halving the
proportion of people whose income is less than one
dollar a day between 1990 and 2015; achieving full
and productive employment and decent work for all,
including women and young people; and halving the
proportion of people who suffer from hunger
between 1990 and 2015.
3.  In 2006, a World Bank-commissioned study
carried out by the Overseas Development Institute
noted that there were 24 ongoing social protection
pilot projects in one district of Malawi alone.
4. The SADC Parliamentary Forum, established in
1996 and formalised by the SADC Summit of Heads
of State and Government in 1997, is a regional
parliamentary organisation representing 14 SADC
member parliaments.
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in encouraging the adoption of
comprehensive social protection coverage
in lower-income countries such as Malawi
and Zambia (a number of countries with
greater fiscal resources, notably South
Africa but also, to a lesser extent, Namibia
and Botswana, have already established a
range of social welfare benefits).
To date, much of the impetus behind the
promotion of social protection in lower-
income countries of southern Africa
has been externally driven, funded
by bilateral and international agencies
and supported by a range of prominent
international NGOs.
The debate on social protection is
dynamic, but it is true to say that
national interest in widespread social
protection in most lower-income
countries has not reached a critical mass,
and it is hard to identify champions of
the cause within national civil society.
Much donor emphasis has been placed
on building an evidence base on the
effectiveness and efficiency of such
instruments. A significant part of donor
support has gone to funding small-scale
pilot studies.3 Relatively little funding has
gone to translating research findings
into policy advice and engaging
in policy dialogue.
The RHVP/SADC-PF Policy Dialogue on
Poverty and Social Transfers Initiative
In 2008, the Regional Hunger and
Vulnerability Programme (RHVP) entered
into an agreement with the Parliamentary
Forum of the Southern African
Development Community (SADC-PF)4
to deliver a two-year capacity building
programme aimed at increasing
parliamentarians’ and parliamentary
staff ’s knowledge and understanding
of the role of social transfers in
poverty reduction.
Despite widespread recognition of
the challenges involved in translating
evidence-based policy advice into
tangible policy change, the RHVP/SADC-PF
policy dialogue is a unique endeavour in
this field in southern Africa—where
donors remain preoccupied with
accumulating yet more evidence by
sponsoring pilot-scale studies, and
where relatively limited resources are
channelled to the dissemination of policy
advice and technical capacity.
Identifying potential drivers or
champions of change, and nurturing
them into effective lobbyists for and
proponents of policy reform, is a key
challenge to winning the war against
poverty, not just in southern Africa.
But it has proven singularly difficult in
practice to identify such individuals
in the region, particularly in the
context of social protection. One study
commissioned by Britain’s Department
for International Development (DFID)
in Zambia in 2006 concluded that
there were few, if any (DFID, 2005).
This is partly because social protection
was, and to some extent still is, not
widely understood and therefore
has few champions.
The search for drivers of change tends
to focus on the government’s executive
branch and on civil society. Parliaments,
the third pillar in the national political
landscape, have been conspicuously
absent from this search, as bilateral
and multilateral development partners
seem cautious to engage directly
with legislatures.
There are several valid reasons for this,
but perhaps the most compelling is
that although most southern African
countries now have multiparty
democracies, the legislative arm of most
governments remains largely ineffective
and sidelined, even undermined, by the
executive. In most of them, therefore,
parliaments have little or no effective
authority, especially at the national level.
Impact. In aggregate, the parliamentarian
policy dialogue initiative exposed over
550 parliamentarians and parliament
staff to a range of issues related to
poverty reduction and the role of
social transfers. Additionally, some 200
individual parliamentarians (most of whom
had also attended the introductory
presentations) underwent more intensive
learning provided by in-depth policy
dialogue workshops.
The aim of the initiative was to increase
parliamentarians’ and parliamentary staff ’s
awareness and knowledge of poverty and
the potential role of social transfers to
combat poverty. The expectation was that
if they had greater understanding of
the issues they would be better placed
to follow, engage in and ultimately
drive the national agenda on poverty
reduction and the role of social transfers.
The initiative was endorsed
overwhelmingly by those who
attended the various events, and
results from “before and after”
perception exercises at the in-depth
workshops indicated a strong positive
shift in attitude towards the role of
social transfers in poverty reduction.
It was significant to note that on many
occasions, participants expressed the view
they were not even aware of what social
transfer initiatives were under way in
their own countries. This is an indication
of the legislature’s current degree of
disengagement from policy making
in many southern African countries.
As regards more specific impact, so far
the policy dialogue has produced a
handful of individual initiatives, such as:
 In Zambia, a parliamentary private
members’ motion in the National
Assembly on 5 March 2010 requested
that the government provide a
detailed report as to when it plans
to scale up the social cash transfer
programme nationally.
 In Malawi, participants at one
of the dialogues in November 2009
in Johannesburg drafted a private
members’ motion for presentation in
parliament during the May–June 2010
budget session.
A significant part of
donor support has gone
to funding small-scale
pilot studies. Relatively
little funding has gone
to translating research
findings into policy
advice and engaging
in policy dialogue.
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With its potential to protect the
vulnerable and promote pro-poor
sustainable development and economic
growth, social protection should move
to the heart of the development agenda.
In 2009, as part of the “Mobilising
European Research for Development
Policy” initiative, the first European
Report on Development (ERD) was
published under the title Overcoming
Fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa.1 The report
explored state fragility in sub-Saharan
Africa and ways of boosting the resilience
of these vulnerable societies so as to
enable them to develop in a sustainable
way and accelerate their progress
towards the Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs).
This year’s report focuses on social
protection. In many ways it is a natural
sequel to ERD 2009 because social
protection can play a crucial role in
reducing vulnerability and bolstering
resilience, as well as in promoting
pro-poor development.
This is all the more crucial when we
consider that, less than five years before
the 2015 deadline for the MDGs, we still
have some way to go on the poverty-
related MDGs. Despite progress in
many fields, such as education and access
If social protection is to
deliver its full potential and
stand a chance of helping to
tackle structural weaknesses,
it needs to be viewed in a
broader time frame and
integrated into a long-term
policy framework.
By ensuring that the essential
needs of the vulnerable are
met, social protection helps
break the vicious cycle
of poverty breeding
more poverty.
It can help facilitate state
building, promoting social
justice and thus enforcing the
social contract between the
state and its citizens.
to water, and the tens of millions of
people who have been lifted from poverty
in Asia and Latin America, much remains
to be done. This is particularly the case in
sub-Saharan Africa, the poorest region
in the world. Although extreme poverty
fell from 58 per cent in 1990 to 51 per cent
in 2005, because of population growth the
number of poor people rose from 296
million to 388 million.
Social Benefits
What exactly is social protection? The
working definition used for the purposes
of the report is that social protection is a
specific set of public actions that tackle
the vulnerability people may experience
during their lives by means of social
insurance, social assistance and
social inclusion efforts.
It is fairly straightforward to figure
out that social protection benefits
the direct recipients of such assistance.
Its advantages, however, penetrate much
deeper than that. Not only do social
protection mechanisms help reduce the
vulnerability of individuals, and hence
of the communities to which they belong,
but they also help promote development
and economic growth.
This is partly because social protection
programmes help ensure that
by Giorgia Giovannetti,
University of Florence and
European University Institute
Development Policy’s
Missing Link
1.  ERD 2009 was written by an interdisciplinary
team under the lead of the European University
Institute in Florence and was widely disseminated.
The present writer was the team’s lead author.
In a sense, the demise of parliaments is a
self-fulfilling prophesy. While it may be
true that in part they do not receive
support or attention because they are
weak, it is equally true that they are weak
because they lack support and attention.
If we are looking for potential drivers
of change, however, parliaments may
prove to be a rich source. As democracy
matures, the legislative branch can be
expected to gain ground in influencing
policy reform at the expense of the
executive and of civil society.
Recognising the potential of legislatures
as champions and drivers of change
is the first step in enabling them to
realize that potential. A key aspect
of parliamentarians, which makes
them potentially forceful champions
of change, is that in a mature democratic
system they have a vested interest in
delivery and performance.
There is a huge and largely unmet
demand from parliaments for capacity
building to increase and improve
awareness and understanding
of a wide range of economic and social
issues. Effective support for capacity
building should be wide-ranging
in its coverage of issues and long-
term in duration. The dividends from
such assistance would not only be
better informed and knowledgeable
parliamentarians, but also stronger
and more engaged parliaments.
DFID (2005). Report of Study on Drivers of
Change for a National Social Protection Scheme
in Zambia. Lusaka, DFID (Zambia office).
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developmental progress made in the
good times is not wiped out during
the bad. Social protection can also act
as an “automatic stabiliser” by transferring a
certain amount of wealth to the needy
and spurring demand during periods
of slowing economic activity. In fact,
evidence suggests that countries with
effective social protection tend to be more
resilient to economic shocks and crises.
By ensuring that the essential needs of
the vulnerable are met, social protection
helps break the vicious cycle of poverty
breeding more poverty. As an expression
of interclass solidarity, social protection
also helps reduce social upheavals and
conflicts. It can help facilitate state
building, promoting social justice
and thus enforcing the social contract
between the state and its citizens.
African Models
Social protection is often regarded as a
luxury that only wealthy societies can
afford, and thus many will be unaware
that social protection, mostly informal, has
deep roots in Africa. In fact, almost every
sub-Saharan African country has some
kind of social protection mechanism.
Partly thanks to efforts by the African
Union, moreover, in the past decade
there has been significant progress
in the African social protection agenda.
For example, a number of African
countries—including South Africa,
Lesotho, Namibia, Kenya and Swaziland—
have cash transfer programmes, such as
old age pensions and child benefits.
The implications of this are that initiatives
to promote social protection should not
view Africa as some kind of “blank slate”,
and should take account of and build on
the existing mechanisms and programmes.
Additionally, there is plenty of space for
mutual learning. African countries can
learn from one another’s experiences,
as well as from other successful social
protection experiments in developing
countries, such as in many parts of Latin
America. There is even room for African
countries to draw lessons from Europe’s
divergent experiences in this area.
Recognising the importance of this kind
of mutual learning, we evaluated and
collected case studies from around the
world for the ERD, finding that under
certain pre-conditions (political
commitment, financial sustainability and
administrative capacity), social protection
is feasible in many developing contexts.
Taking the Long View
When considering social protection, which
tends to provide people with temporary
support in times of need, it is tempting to
think mostly in the immediate and short
term. But if social protection is to deliver
its full potential and stand a chance of
helping to tackle structural weaknesses,
it needs to be viewed in a broader time
frame and integrated into a long-term
policy framework.
In sub-Saharan Africa, however,
a number of obstacles stand in the way.
For one, the macroeconomic situation
in many African countries is not very
conducive to this kind of social spending.
Most countries suffer from a shortage
of resources to pay for social protection.
This is partly because they are poor, but
also because they do not have effective
mechanisms for mobilising domestic
resources, such as taxes.
Addressing this shortfall requires the
mobilisation of more domestic resources
and the reallocation of public spending.
A survey of African stakeholders carried
out in the context of the ERD found that
most believed that African governments
were committed to social protection,
although coverage still needs to be
improved. This is backed up by the
fact that 15 sub-Saharan African
countries include social protection
in their constitutions. This apparent
commitment should make the
reprioritising of public spending easier.
In the short term, and for a transitional
period, external sources of finance,
such as grants and loans from donors,
can be used to pave the way. The survey
mentioned above, however, revealed that
the vast majority of African stakeholders
believed that external donor programmes
lack sufficient post-implementation
follow-up, such as capacity building
and long-term financing. This should
be borne in mind by the European
Union and other donors. 
A survey carried in the
context of the European
Report on Development
(ERD) revealed that the
vast majority of African
stakeholders believed
that external donor
programmes lack
sufficient post-
implementation
follow-up, such as
capacity building and
long-term financing.
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Social protection is an increasingly
popular response to poverty and
vulnerability but, despite decades of
evidence of the gendered dimensions
of poverty and vulnerability, the extent
to which social protection has integrated
gender has been uneven at best.
Many programmes assume that targeting
women will, in itself, address gender
inequality. While this is an important
first step, the role of gender in social
protection is more complex. Promoting
gender equality is often a secondary
or indirect programme objective, and
social protection has often reinforced
the traditional roles of women and girls,
and men and boys.
Few programmes have harnessed the
potential for a transformation of gender
relations that would improve the impact of
programmes on poverty and vulnerability.
This article briefly summarises findings
from multi-country primary research in
Africa, Asia and Latin America on the
incorporation of gender into the design
and implementation of a wide range
of social protection instruments.1
Gender-Sensitive Programme Design
To date, social protection policies and
programmes have largely focused
on addressing economic risks and
vulnerabilities. Little attention has been
paid to the social dimensions of risk and
vulnerability, such as gender inequality,
social discrimination and unequal
power relations. For many poor and
marginalised populations, social sources
of vulnerability are often as important
as or even more important than
economic shocks and stresses as barriers
to sustainable livelihoods and general
wellbeing. Moreover, gendered economic
and social risks are often multiple and
overlapping, resulting in chronic poverty
and vulnerability across the life-course
and potentially between generations.
Few social protection programmes seek
mainly to empower girls and women, or
to transform gender relations. In some
cases, the only consideration of gender
is the inclusion of women as a target
beneficiary group. Other programmes
ignore gender altogether. Such sidelining
of gender equality has resulted in a
narrow conceptualisation of gendered
vulnerabilities and a focus on supporting
the traditional household responsibilities
of women (for example, as the recipients
of cash or in-kind transfers).
Other programmes have limited
their economic participation to sectors
with low growth and limited income
opportunities, rather than promoting
opportunities in and skills for more
remunerative growth sectors.
Indeed, few have prioritised transforming
intra-household relations in their design,
so as to ensure that increased household
income or benefits are allocated equally,
or to challenge inequalities in decision
making, ownership or divisions of
labour in the household.
That said, gender-sensitive design
features can be found in several social
protection programmes. Research by
the Overseas Development Institute
has highlighted a range of such features
in cash- and asset-transfer programmes
in Bangladesh, Ghana and Peru, public
works programmes in Ethiopia and India,
and subsidised social services in Mexico.
Gender-sensitive cash and asset
transfers include:
 Support to girls’ and women’s
access to schooling and health
facilities, particularly during
pregnancy and nursing.
 Linking beneficiaries to
complementary services and
programmes that aim to address
social risks by raising awareness of
gender-based violence and promoting
access to civic documentation.
Few social protection
programmes seek mainly to
empower girls and women,
or to transform
gender relations.
In some cases, the only
consideration of gender
is the inclusion of women
as a target beneficiary group.
Other programmes ignore
gender altogether.
The challenges in programme
implementation, however,
can also have unintended
negative impacts on women
and gender relations.
Because of assumptions
about “appropriate” types of
work and pay for women and
for men, for example, men
still receive higher wages
and on average women have
fewer days of work in public
works programmes.
When social protection
instruments are part of a
broader package of social and
economic policy objectives,
they are more likely to help
transform gender relations
among men, women,
boys and girls.
by Rebecca Holmes and Nicola Jones,
Overseas Development Institute (ODI),
London
Social Protection Programming:
The Need for a Gender Lens
1. See <http://www.odi.org.uk/work/projects/
details.asp?id=1020&title=gender-vulnerability-social-
protection> for country reports and synthesis products
by ODI and partners.
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 Promotion of women’s participation
and leadership at the community
level by training women as
community facilitators to act as links
between programme implementers
and beneficiaries.
Gender-sensitive public works
features include:
 Promotion of women’s participation
through quotas and the provision of
equal wages in economic activities.
 Provision of childcare arrangements
and flexible working hours for
women, given their care and
domestic responsibilities.
 Provision of direct cash or food
transfers to pregnant or nursing
women in labour-constrained
households, instead of waged
manual labour.
 Creation of community assets
that reduce women’s time poverty,
such as developing fuel wood and
water collection sources close to
villages, or to compensate for the
labour shortages characteristic
among female-headed households
by using public works labour
to support agricultural work
on land that is owned privately
by such households.
 Participation of women in community
discussions of the programme.
Translating Design into Implementation
Unsurprisingly, the mixed record of
integrating gender into programme
design has had both positive and
negative impacts on gender equality,
since programmes are not implemented
in a vacuum but interact with pre-
existing socioeconomic, institutional
and cultural conditions and systems.
At an individual level, public works
programmes have generated important
economic opportunities for women,
and have often given women higher
income by providing equal wages and
opportunities to access better paid
and less abusive forms of work.
The challenges in programme
implementation, however, can also
have unintended negative impacts on
women and gender relations. Because of
assumptions about “appropriate” types
of work and pay for women and for men,
for example, men still receive higher
wages and on average women have
fewer days of work in public works
programmes. In Ethiopia and India the
actual provision of childcare facilities is
rare, despite its inclusion in the
programme design. In Bangladesh,
Ethiopia and India, many women can
only access their income through their
husbands, because they do not have
their own bank accounts or because
cultural attitudes restrict their mobility
to go to the market. Hence prevailing
sociocultural attitudes, combined with
limited knowledge and capacities among
programme officers, mean that the
gender aspects of the programme design
are rarely prioritised or demanded.
At the household level, a wide range
of social protection interventions have
helped participant households to better
meet their immediate basic needs. These
have helped meet women’s practical
needs, given women’s responsibility
for managing the household.
The intra-household impact of social
protection, however, has been mixed.
Interventions have supported children’s
schooling and nutrition, but the impact
on relations between men and women at
the household level is more complex.
In Peru, for example, women’s
involvement in the programme,
and in complementary activities
such as awareness-raising meetings,
has increased their mobility, but in some
cases it has also exacerbated their time
poverty. Elsewhere, some programmes
have created or aggravated tensions
in the household, especially where
participation has meant a shift in
women’s roles or responsibilities.
In Mexico and Peru, male opposition
has started to decline as men see the
programme’s benefits. In Peru, linking
recipients with complementary
programmes and visibly enhancing
women’s leadership in the community
have been critical to reducing gender-
based violence and supporting changes
in the household division of labour.
This is particularly so among the younger
generation, with men taking on more
domestic tasks when women attend
programme meetings.
At the community level, women
report that their participation
in social protection programmes
has increased their household’s
participation in informal community
activities. But evidence suggests that this
has had only a limited impact to date on
women’s involvement in the governance
structures of programmes or in community
meetings and decision making.
Cultural and social norms still prevent
their active engagement in decision
making at the community level, and
women are also excluded when meetings
are held at times that clash with
their domestic responsibilities.
Conclusions and Policy
Recommendations
To date, the focus on gender in social
protection policy and programming has
been uneven, partly because of complex
political-economy dynamics. To address
this, and given the multi-dimensional
nature of poverty and vulnerability,
social protection policies and
programmes should be informed by a
clear analysis of gendered economic
and social vulnerabilities.
Social protection programmes with
strong and well-coordinated linkages
to complementary programmes and
services are therefore critical. When social
protection instruments are part of a
broader package of social and economic
policy objectives, they are more likely to
help transform gender relations among
men, women, boys and girls. Strong
linkages are needed, for example, across
health and reproductive health services,
social development and rights awareness
training, access to credit and
employment training.
Thus far the implementation of gender-
related social protection programme
components has been weak,
undermining the potential of gender-
sensitive programme design. Tackling
this requires more attention to political-
economy factors, developing tailored
and ongoing capacity building for
programme implementers, and
sensitising programme participants
about gender-related programme aims.
It is also critical to promote learning
within and across countries about
promising practices in gender-sensitive
design and implementation. 
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India’s post-reform growth
and development trajectory has been
marked by a disjunction between
growth, on the one hand, and
employment, income and equality on the
other. While GDP per capita has grown
faster in the post-reform period than in
the period before the reforms (the 1991
budget is considered as the beginning of
the reform period), income, sectoral and
regional inequalities have increased.
The high growth rate of GDP has not
been matched by a corresponding
growth in job creation. There are also
issues of structural transformation.
High growth in the secondary and
tertiary sectors is not matched by growth
in the primary sector, which absorbs most
of the labour force and population.
The agricultural sector even recorded
negative growth in some years
of the reform phase.
The social and political consequences
of this growth are far more serious.
Apart from causing discontent in the
segments of the population that
growth has passed by, there are graver
consequences such as unstable politics
and violent social conflicts. The National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005,
aptly renamed as the Mahatma Gandhi
National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act/Scheme (MGNREGA/S),1 is an attempt
to address some of these issues.
This article argues that the MGNREGA/S
is not merely a livelihood-security
programme but a new approach to
development. It enshrines the principle
that a minimum livelihood security is a
non-negotiable democratic development
right of citizens, whatever the course
of development. There are many
implementation-related bottlenecks,
but future prospects lie in the fact
that the right to work has entered
into the popular imagination.
The programme enjoys full political
consensus; civil society is rising;
and local institutions are responding.
Coverage and Scale of Operation
The scheme has massive coverage and
its public works are some of the biggest
in the world. It gives entitlement to the
entire rural population, which comprises
72 per cent of the total population
(according to the 2001 census). In a state
like Bihar, this rises to 90 per cent of the
population. About 38 per cent of all
rural households were provided with
employment in 2009–10. That figure rose
from 15.25 per cent in 2006–07 to
38.17 per cent in 2009–10.
Good Targeting through Self-Targeting
Poor targeting of beneficiaries has been
one of the main drawbacks of India’s
poverty alleviation and social assistance
programmes. This scheme is based on
the principle of self-targeting, and the
approach has worked well. Most of the
employment days have been earned by
Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe
(ST) households, and by women.
The concentration of poverty is highest
among the SC and ST households.
About 50 per cent of employment
days under the scheme are earned by
women workers, though participation
varies by state.
Income Security for Households
Wage income from MGNREGS is a
significant part of the annual income of
beneficiary households. This amounts to
19 per cent in states such as Rajasthan,
Himachal Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand
(average of four states). The figure varies
across states and individual households,
depending on the household’s number
of person-days and the availability of
other sources of income.
There are many
implementation-related
bottlenecks in MGNREGA,
but future prospects lie
in the fact that the right
to work has entered into
the popular imagination.
The programme enjoys full
political consensus; civil
society is rising; and local
institutions are responding.
Apart from providing
livelihood security, MGNREGA
has managed to create a huge
number of community assets
that might have multiplier
effects. Some studies show
that the multiplier effects
of employment guarantee
schemes are greater than
those of cash transfers.
by Ashok Pankaj,
Institute for Human Development,
New Delhi
Changing the Face
of Development in India:
the NREGA experience
1. Mahatma Gandhi had a vision of reconstructing
independent India on the basis of right to work and
autonomous village republics.
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Reduction in Indebtedness and Migration:
The incidence of indebtedness is huge in
rural areas. A study of MGNREGS workers
in Bihar shows that in 2006, some 38 per
cent of these households were indebted;
by 2008, only 31.37 per cent of them
remained indebted. The ratio of indebted
households declined by about seven
percentage points in two years
(Pankaj, 2008: 130).
Various studies suggest that MGNREGS
has resulted in reduced distress
and seasonal migration. Migration
by beneficiary households declined by
about 12 percentage points between
2006 and 2008 in Bihar (Pankaj, 2008: 132).
Similar trends have been observed in
other states. Moreover, workers were
found to be more satisfied while working
in their own villages. Even the savings of
MGNREGS workers were greater, because
there is no cost involved in seeking work.
Community-Level/Macro Impacts
Community-level impacts are yet to be
registered in any significant way, but
there are some indications that the
employment guarantee scheme has
managed to meet some of its macro-level
objectives. A huge number of community
assets are being constructed, generally
related to water conservation, harvesting
and rural connectivity, touching every
village in the country. There are concerns
about the quality of the assets being
created, their durability and sectional
control of the benefits. But the very
numerous water harvesting and water
conservation projects are meant to
increase the amount of cultivable land
and raise agricultural productivity in low-
irrigation areas. Farmers who are unable
to invest in land development are
receiving assistance to bring their
uncultivable land under cultivation.
In several places, increased rural
connectivity has many effects. Apart
from lowering the cost of transport,
it increases rural-urban links and helps
the rural population secure better
prices for their agricultural products.
The empowerment of women is
another significant social impact of
the programme. A study of women
workers in four northern states shows
that MGNREGS has had individual and
community-level empowerment effects on
women workers (Pankaj and Tankha, 2010).
At the individual level, there are three
significant effects: (i) income-consumption
effects; (ii) intra-household effects
(an increased decision making role for
women); and (iii) widening choice and
capability. At the community level, the
high participation of women under
MGNREGS, apart from bringing about
male-female wage parity, helps correct
the skewed labour market conditions.
Women’s participation in gram sabha
(village councils) and their joining public
works in large numbers will have several
other effects. The introduction of what is
known as the female “mate system”
has been favourable to changing
gender relations: for male workers,
it is an entirely new experience to
work under a female mate.
Difficulties and Challenges
There are difficulties and challenges
in meeting the main goals of MNREGS.
The programme is yet to become
demand-driven and civil society-oriented.
In most states, employment is being
provided on the basis of the availability
of work, and the local bureaucracy
controls implementation. The small
number of person-days does not
stem from an absence of demand for
employment, but from the inability of the
implementing agencies to provide jobs on
demand. Additionally, the unemployment
allowance that completes the entitlement
cycle is not being paid because the
demand-based provisions are not
functioning, and because of the control
of the bureaucracy, which is responsible
for the payment of the allowance. Other
factors behind the modest realisation
of the entitlement are limited awareness
among poor households, ineffective
grievance mechanisms and insufficient
civil society mobilisation.
Prospects: Cash Transfer versus
Employment Guarantee
If the main goal of the MGNREGS is to
provide a minimum livelihood security to
poor households, is cash transfer a better
option? The arguments in favour of cash
transfer are strengthened by the
weaknesses of implementation. Certainly,
it is easier to provide a minimum income
through cash transfer than through
an employment programme.
MGNREGS, however, is not merely a
livelihood-security programme, though
that is the avowed main objective of the
Act. Its context, rising income, sectoral
and regional inequality with high
GDP growth, and its other macro-level
objectives elevate it from merely a
cash transfer to a new approach to
development. Apart from providing
livelihood security, it has managed
to create a huge number of community
assets that might have multiplier effects.
Some studies show that the multiplier
effects of employment guarantee
schemes are greater than those of cash
transfers (Narayana, Parikh and Srinivasan,
1988). Greater community participation in
local development, the strengthening
of local institutions and women’s
participation through empowerment
are also entirely new consequences.
Despite the difficulties and challenges
involved in running such a vast
programme, future prospects lie
in the following developments:
 The right to work has entered into
the imaginations of ordinary people.
 The programme enjoys
unprecedented political consensus.
 Civil society is rising for attainment
of its entitlements.
 Local institutions have started
responding to demand. 
Narayana N. S. S., Kirit Parikh and T. N.
Srinivasan (1988). Rural Works Programmes
in India: Costs and Benefits. Journal of
Development Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 131-156.
Pankaj, Ashok (2008). Processes, Institutions
and Mechanisms of Implementation of
NREGA: Impact Assessment of Bihar and
Jharkhand. New Delhi, Institute for
Human Development.
Pankaj, Ashok and Rukmini Tankha (2010).
‘Empowerment Effects of the NREGS on
Women Workers: A Study in Four States’,
Economic and Political Weekly 45 (30), 45–55.
Wage income from
MGNREGA is a significant
part of the annual income
of beneficiary households.
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Now that the positive
developmental impacts of cash transfers
have been unequivocally proven by
evidence from a variety of schemes
around the world, and implementation
is being scaled up in many instances,
attention is shifting towards ensuring
the efficiency, transparency and
effectiveness of administration.
The panel on social information and
delivery systems heard presentations
from three countries that are in various
stages of implementing comprehensive
social information systems. Discussion
focused on lessons learned and
experience to date.
Country Experiences
The Chile Solidario programme has
one of the longest established and most
comprehensive integrated management
information systems in the field of social
protection programming.
Designed as a ‘bridge’ to connect
extremely poor and vulnerable families
to a variety of social initiatives and
services, as well as to strengthen their
capacities for social inclusion, Chile
Solidario focuses on ensuring “inclusion”
in administrative structures and on
providing easy access to information
on the range of programmes that could
facilitate a movement out of poverty.
Hence the interlinked system, based
on a modular infrastructure, has allowed
various datasets to be integrated and is
accessible by government departments
at several levels: municipalities, provinces
and regions, as well as by those
providing a variety of public services.
Every Chilean citizen has a national
identity number and the identification
module for the integrated information
system draws on such information
from the civil registry service.
The module contains personal
information (name, age, sex, address),
which together with the social and
demographic data that form the basis of
the Chilean Social Protection Scorecard is
used for targeting based on Chile’s
preferred use of multidimensional
vulnerability criteria.
Consequently, this is known as the
Social Integrated Information System
(SIIS) and it involves more than just a
single registry of actual beneficiaries.
It is likely to be of interest to countries
in moving towards a more integrated
approach to designing programmes
based on multidimensional poverty
criteria and in devising a delivery
system that can facilitate proactive
government support and coordination
in programming.
The SIIS has been developed as a
modular, interoperable system using
open-source software tools that limit
the overall costs of development and
licensing. Thus it is also highly
susceptible to scaling up at a relatively
low cost (on the design and approach,
see Salas Portuguez, 2010), and
potentially to customisation in the
context of South-South collaboration.
Mauritius’s social protection
system encompasses a variety of cash
transfer programmes (most notably a
basic pension scheme), complemented by
active labour market policies. Mauritius is
undertaking an institutional reform
strategy with a view to “managing
its social assistance programmes in an
integrated way, enhancing the targeting
performance of such programmes,
facilitating more effective economic
analysis and monitoring policies, and
adopting a more unified approach to
welfare to reduce leakages and address
under-coverage” (Sooben, 2010).
The Chile Solidario
programme has one of the
longest established and most
comprehensive integrated
management information
systems in the field of social
protection programming.
Mauritius is undertaking
an institutional reform
strategy with a view to
“managing its social
assistance programmes
in an integrated way,
enhancing the targeting
performance of such
programmes, facilitating
more effective economic
analysis and monitoring
policies, and adopting a
more unified approach to
welfare to reduce leakages
and address under-coverage”
(Sooben, 2010).
by Katharine Vincent,
Regional Hunger and Vulnerability
Programme, Johannesburg
Innovations in Administering
Social Protection
Programmes
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In this context, it is moving
towards a single registry system
for the management of social assistance
programmes provided by the various
government departments. Currently,
all Mauritian citizens are issued with a
national ID number at birth and are then
provided a card at the age of majority,
but the departments in charge of social
protection assistance all use their own
databases to manage the beneficiaries
of their programmes.
A recent restructuring of central
administration has catalysed the debate
on a single registry, which is occurring
concurrently with a decision to shift the
preferred method of targeting away
from means-tested income to the
inclusion of a set of variables other
than income, and to the use of different
approaches to address the needs
of different constituencies. For example,
the new approach is expected to enable
the Ministry of Social Security to identify
beneficiaries more effectively and to
promote social protection of vulnerable
groups such as the elderly, children
and the disabled.
A new Ministry of Social Integration
will be responsible for individuals in
more transient categories of need,
such as people of working age who
are temporarily unemployed and
who are believed to be better served by
empowerment programmes. Mauritius’s
Ministry of Social Security already has an
electronic network for the registration
of beneficiaries, and beneficiaries’ records
are easily accessible electronically
from any of its local offices
throughout the island.
Once the cabinet agrees on proposed
changes to targeting and institutional
reform, the single registry can be
made available to other government
departments so as to reduce duplication,
address under-coverage and ensure a
better fit across programmes.
Because of the size of its population,
India has the highest mountain to climb,
but the unique ID programme has been
launched and the first citizens were
issued with universal ID (UID) numbers
in late September 2010, well within the
stipulated timeline of 18 months after
August 2009. Some 600 million more are
expected to be registered in the next five
years. The UID (now known as Aadhaar)
project is being seen as a critical
component of India’s approach to
inclusive growth. Proving identity
is a first step towards being able
to access public services, and is also
central to encouraging empowerment
and accountability.
The motivation for this initiative stems
largely from the difficulty that many
poor and vulnerable citizens face in
being able to prove their identity,
without which they are typically unable
to access services to which they are
entitled. The secondary benefit is
streamlining registration, making it far
more efficient and thus cost-effective
for the government to provide public
services and for the recipient to access
them. This applies to more universal
initiatives as well as targeted
programmes and conditional cash
transfers (see Mukherjee, 2010).
The Indian government has approved
the “Know Your Resident” identity check
as sufficient for banks to use in meeting
the “Know Your Customer” regulations.
Those with a UID can then register for
a bank account and receive payment at
any mini ATM (point-of-sale device)
in the country. This is a significant
benefit in effective cash delivery in a
country with poor infrastructure for the
physical transfer of cash, such as bank
branches and post offices.
Thus an added bonus of this initiative is
to facilitate access to financial services
and banking for those who hitherto were
unbanked. To lower the potential costs
involved in the UID scheme, no cards
are issued—only a number—and the
biometric fingerprint data held on
the system is required for verification
to receive payments.
Unlike Chile, India has decided only
to use the single registry (which is
voluntary for all Indians) for five
personal attributes, with the sole
purpose of proving identity. Applicants’
UID numbers can be authenticated
in response to queries on inclusion in
various beneficiary databases, to address
both inclusion and exclusion errors.
In India, the Universal ID
(now known as Aadhaar)
project is being seen as a
critical component of
India’s approach to
inclusive growth.
Proving identity is a first
step towards being able
to access public services,
and is also central
to encouraging
empowerment and
accountability.
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Registration for the UID can take
place at any designated office, including
banks, insurance companies and
government departments.
Emerging Issues and Lessons for Other
Countries in the South
A single-registry management
information system seems the most
effective way of reducing many of the
administrative costs of social protection
programmes. Should other countries
be interested, there is a wealth of
experience around the world and many
opportunities for South-South learning.
One of the biggest obstacles to a
single registry in many southern African
countries is the absence of a national
identity scheme that charts and links, at
a minimum, births and deaths. Swaziland,
for example, with its relatively small
population, decided to introduce a
personal identification number (PIN)
after the King’s decision to introduce
an old age grant.
The fact that beneficiaries did not already
have a PIN raised questions about
eligibility and led to inclusion and
exclusion errors. Of course, if such a
national identity scheme is launched
at the same time as a categorical cash
transfer such as an old age pension,
it can provide a perverse incentive
for falsification of information if
cross-checks and biometric attributes
are not built into the initiative.
Chile and Mauritius did not have
this challenge when implementing/
considering a single registry, but the
fact that India is aiming to register
600 million people over the next five
years shows that this is far from an
insurmountable hurdle. And of course
once the system exists, it has benefits
other beyond the social protection
sphere, such as maintenance
of the electoral register.
Another major obstacle to a single
registry, and one that Mauritius is likely
to face in the coming months, is the
potential reluctance of other line
ministries and government departments
to relinquish their own databases
and information management systems,
suggesting a need for a clear policy on
advocacy and incentives. Though it
seems perverse that agencies of the
citizen-oriented civil service should be
unable to see the broader benefits
of a single registry, they are often
preoccupied with their own
pre-existing systems. The decision for
change can only come from above, and
social service-oriented ministries typically
have less influence in the executive, so
the world will pay close attention to the
way in which Mauritius’ Ministry of Social
Security negotiates this potentially
contested terrain.
Questions after the panel presentations
raised a number of matters regarding the
ease of introducing a single registry and/
or a unique ID number (Mauritius will
have both). Concerns about privacy
and the management of personal
information are not thought to be
a major problem in Chile, which
has a long history of data collection.
In Mauritius the recently enacted data
protection law ensures that the data
commissioner has to approve the
transfer of any data, even from one
government department to another.
India’s UID Authority has been working
to address privacy concerns: a query
to the Authority elicits only a yes/no
response as to whether individuals are
who they claim to be; there are no details
and thus no invasion of privacy.
Ensuring ease as well as accuracy in the
recording of address data was also raised
as an issue, given population mobility
and individuals’ frequent inability to
prove place of residence. In Chile the
onus is on individuals to prove their
address and to update their records
in the address changes.
This is simple, since all departments
use the same Social Protection
Scorecard for their purposes. In India,
if individuals cannot prove their address,
their information can be linked to their
“introducer” (someone who already has a
UID or Aadhaar number and can “vouch”
for the person seeking to enrol); thus an
approximate idea of their location will be
available. This is important given the vast
potential use of the UID in other rights-
based and targeted programmes in the
future, not to mention other unrelated
opportunities. Current discussions have
pointed out that there is still some scope
for fraud, either through a “colluding
introducer” or the use of fake supporting
documents, but also that potentially one
can only fake an identity once, and this
prevents the large-scale creation of
“ghost identities”.
The introduction of a single registry
management information system has its
challenges: it requires financial inputs,
technology, integration with other
government departments (and private
sector partners for delivery), and political
will. But there are clear long-term
gains to a more efficient and effective
administration of social protection
programmes, for both the government
and the beneficiaries.
Chile is one of the countries leading the
way in this regard, as is Brazil. Mauritius
and India are close behind, and many
countries that are in the early stages of
introducing cash transfers, such as East
Timor, have also deemed the benefits
of a single registry to outweigh the costs.
There is a range of experiences on
which to build, and thus no country
considering this strategy should feel
that it has to advance alone.
For presentations, see:
<http://pressroom.ipc-undp.org/about/3-
day-workshop-on-social-protection/>.
 Chile Solidario: Rodrigo Alberto Salas
Portuguez, Deputy Director of
Institutional Development, FOSIS.
 Mauritius Unique Identity Number
and move towards single registry:
Jayavadee Sooben, Principal
Assistant Secretary, Ministry of
Social Security, National Solidarity
and Senior Citizens Welfare and
Reform Institutions.
 India, Universal ID Number, Anit
Mukerjee, Research Fellow, NIPFP. 
For more information on the schemes
mentioned in this article, see:
Chile: <www.fosis.cl> and
<http://siis.mideplan.cl> (the single registry).
Mauritius: <http://www.gov.mu/portal/site/
ssnssite/>.
India: <www.uidai.gov.in>.
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On 28 January 2009, the Unique ID
Authority of India (UIDAI) was set up as
an “attached office” of the Planning
Commission, with a mandate to issue
identity numbers to Indian residents.
This has become known as the Unique ID
(UID) number project. The timeframe for
the introduction of the UID number was
between September and February 2010,
with a target of 600 million voluntary
enrolments by 2014.
The first milestone has already been
reached: the first 10 UID numbers were
given to selected residents in the remote
tribal village of Thembli in the state
of Maharashtra on 29 September 2010.
Preparations for the introduction of the
scheme across the country are
progressing rapidly.
Every major project of this magnitude
has a context. The UID project has its
roots in a growing perception among
policymakers, as well as in the findings of
an increasing body of empirical research,
that the benefits of government policies
and programmes are not reaching the
truly poor and marginalised sections
of the population.
At the same time, the amount being
spent on social protection programmes
is greater than ever before: nearly
4 per cent of GDP is spent by the federal
government alone on “flagship” schemes
in the fields of poverty alleviation, health,
education, nutrition and so on.
One of the critical barriers for
the poor with regard to accessing
public services is providing
documentation to prove who they are.
It is also difficult for the government
to track whether the benefits of poverty
reduction schemes are actually paid to
the intended beneficiaries. The primary
mandate of the UID project is to create
the conditions for better and more efficient
delivery of public services and programmes,
especially those aimed at tackling
poverty and achieving the Millennium
Development Goals (MDGs) by providing
“a unique identification number
linked to the residents’ demographic
and biometric information, which
they can use to identify themselves
anywhere in India, and to access a
host of benefits and services.
The number (referred to until now as the
‘UID’) has been named Aadhaar, which
translates into ‘foundation’ or ‘support’.”1
The UID provides a multipurpose
platform for inclusion. It was recognised
at an early stage of the project’s
conceptualisation that merely building
another pipeline for the delivery of
social protection benefits would not
lead to “inclusiveness” in the long run.
The evidence from several academic
studies and policy reports pointed
to the lack of access to formal financial
institutions such as banks, post offices
and their direct intermediaries as a
major reason for rural poverty
and indebtedness.
Less than 10 per cent of India’s villages
have a bank branch within a radius of
five kilometres. The rural poor and the
illiterate feel disempowered to engage
with the banking institutions,
the first obstacle being the inability
to provide proof of identity.
For a migrant labourer and his family,
this lack of financial access means that
sending money home is riskier, apart
from the fact that the informal financial
market charges a much higher rate of
interest on his financial transactions.
For a long-term poverty alleviation
programme to be successful, therefore,
One of the critical barriers
for the poor with regard
to accessing public services
is providing documentation
to prove who they are.
The primary mandate
of the UID project is to create
the conditions for better
and more efficient delivery
of public services
and programmes.
India’s UID or Brazil’s
Single Registry can be
the first steps towards
effective grievance redressal
mechanisms, which are often
ignored in policy discussions
on inclusive growth.
by Anit Mukerjee,
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
New Delhi
Tackling Poverty
in India: The Role
of the Unique ID Number
1. See <http://uidai.gov.in>.
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it also has to be seen in the context of a
financial inclusion strategy. The UID project
tried to incorporate an approach to
facilitating micropayments into its design
from its inception. This involves helping
poor residents to easily establish their
identity to banks, thus reducing the
transaction costs for banks to reach
out to the underserved
Better public service delivery along with
financial inclusion needs a third factor:
greater accountability and transparency in
the use of public resources. Without a
focus on governance, neither public
service delivery nor financial inclusion
strategies would be able to deliver the
kind of systemic changes required for the
“big push” to end poverty and achieve
the MDGs within a realistic timeframe.
Several countries, however, have moved
independently towards legal structures
for data transparency and disclosure
norms since the 1990s. Assuming that the
programmes in question can effectively
identify all the intended beneficiaries,
India’s UID  and the Single Registry
(Cadastro Único) in Brazil, as well as
systems in Chile and other Latin
American countries, can essentially
be viewed as a step towards better
standards of governance and
accountability, by contributing to
open and transparent governance
in the delivery of public services.
In this regard, India’s UID or Brazil’s
Single Registry can also be the first steps
towards effective grievance redressal
mechanisms, which are often ignored in
policy discussions on inclusive growth.
The UID shares some characteristics with
initiatives such as Brazil’s Cadastro Único
and Chile’s Sistema Integrado de
Información Social (SIIS), but it differs
in that the 12-digit Aadhaar number
will be used for all government schemes
and programmes but the registry will
contain only a person’s demographic
and biometric information, not data
on income or other multidimensional
poverty criteria used for targeting.
It has to be understood at the outset,
therefore, that a UID number cannot
eliminate targeting errors. If a social
protection programme is designed
to include only those below a
certain threshold level of income or
consumption (“poverty line”), then the
UID number per se will not enable
identification of all the intended
beneficiaries. But once the beneficiaries
are identified through other methods,
the UID number (along with financial
inclusion) can make the social protection
programme more efficient by matching
the benefits with the beneficiaries while
minimising leakage.
If the full potential of the UID as a
targeting and delivery platform is
to be realised, information on the
whole network of government benefits,
transfers and receipts needs to be made
available by linking all the databases
that are now highly fragmented.
This is something that needs to be
reflected upon, and lessons can
be learned from other countries
of the global South.
UID-Linked Social Protection for Poverty
Alleviation and Achieving the MDGs
A broad-based, UID-enabled public
service delivery mechanism that
takes achievement of the MDGs
as a benchmark needs several elements
embedded into the policy design.
We outline some of the major
opportunities and challenges below.
Universal and targeted benefits
As a principle, universal and
homogeneous endowments are
easier to implement than highly
targeted benefits with complex
means-testing and eligibility criteria.
It is generally believed that universal
endowments would be expensive to
implement, but that is mitigated by
self-selection and self-targeting, such
that the costs remain more or less the
same. Universal benefits, however, may
not be politically justifiable from the
equity perspective, so we are resigned
to live in a world in which targeting is
the norm and not the exception.
As mentioned above, single registry
systems (including the UID, which
encompasses more than the set of
eligible beneficiaries for programmes
targeted at the poor)2 will, by definition,
The UID provides
a multipurpose
platform for inclusion.
The rural poor and
the illiterate feel
disempowered to engage
with the banking
institutions, the first
obstacle being the
inability to provide
proof of identity.
2. The UID in its current form “collates“
two separate schemes initially envisaged:
a National Population Register under the
Citizenship Act of 1955, and the Unique
Identification Number project for below
poverty line (BPL) families of the Department
of Information Technology. The UID is open to any
individual who is a resident in India and satisfies
the verification process laid down by the UIDAI.
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have a certain level of in-built targeting
errors. With greater communication
across databases, however, the
targeting errors can be moderated
to a large extent. Smaller countries
at an early stage of designing a single
registry system will have a comparative
advantage in introducing the necessary
strategy, so that errors of inclusion and
exclusion can be minimised in the design
of social protection policies.
Addressing the demand and
supply side of service delivery
The experience in most countries that are
lagging in meeting the MDGs is that the
demand for public services surpasses
the supply. The reverse can also be
true—that the supply of public services
far exceeds the demand.
The reason for the former is obvious:
people demand more public services
than the countries in the global South
can supply, given their budgetary and
capacity constraints. On the other hand,
there are also instances of empty public
schools and health facilities: people
voting with their feet and paying
for private health and education
services because of poor standards
in the public system.
A major reason for this mismatch is the
lack of data. Government systems are
typically constructed and run according
to a set of norms that rarely take account
of actual needs. For example, from the
ante-natal to the pre-school stage
(0–6 years), there are at least six major
worldwide programmes that relate
directly or indirectly to MDGs 1–5,
especially those concerned with
maternal and child health.
Identifying and tracking families
that access such public services can
be one of the core value additions
of an UID-based system in India.
The tracking of beneficiaries and the
transfer of benefits through the financial
channel (in the case of the cash transfer
component of the programme) are
both location-independent.
In this context, UID-enabled service
delivery systems can generate the data
needed to identify where additional
programme capacity may be needed, by
tracking the beneficiaries across
the country in the maternal and child
health programmes.
At the policy level too, awareness
can be raised about planning priorities
to better match demand and supply
for public services.
Leveraging technology for appropriate
delivery of public services
Governments around the world spend
considerable sums of money on what
are known as “e-governance” systems.
In most cases, systems are set up
separately for each programme and
thereafter these operate as “silos”
without an overarching vision of how
the systems can fit together to achieve
better results in the short and long run.
Once set up, however, they become white
elephants with their own protocols of
database management, and are slowly
rendered redundant because of their lack
of “interoperability”—that is, how much
of the data generated can be used by
other systems across different platforms.
It is important to understand that
government bureaucracies generate
different kinds of data that are mostly
budgetary and administrative.
The data systems, however, rarely
record transactions at the level of
detail that would be useful in tracking
public service delivery or use of the
cash transfer system, for example.
Having single-registry systems
like the UID or the Cadastro Único
provides an opportunity to re-engineer
data collection, management,
sharing and analysis under one
overarching platform.
In other words, within the delivery
mechanism to address a particular MDG,
the use of technology and the single
registry/UID database can be used to
stratify information that is appropriate
for each target group.
It is only then that the power
of identity can be combined with
the power of technology to generate the
power of information—to be channelled
into better service delivery, broader
inclusion and greater accountability. 
The UID shares some
characteristics with
initiatives such as Brazil’s
Cadastro Único and
Chile’s Sistema Integrado
de Información Social
(SIIS), but it differs in
that the registry will
contain only a person’s
demographic and
biometric information,
not data on income or
other multidimensional
poverty criteria used
for targeting.
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